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INTRODUCTION 
This review was initiated by the Oversight Committee (OC) of the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). As originally conceived, it was 
to be a “Retrospective review of the Third CGIAR System Review process.” The overall 
purpose of the review was to “. . . learn from the experience of the Third System Review 
by identifqring best practices and drawing lessons for system reviews to be conducted in 
the future.” The more specific purpose was to “. . . focus on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the processes used in planning, conducting, reporting, and follow-up the 
Third System Review.” 
This was our initial focus. Two of the team members had experience with the 
Third System Review, one as a donor representative and one as a Center Board Chair. 
Personal files as well as the archives of the review in the CGIAR Secretariat library were 
examined. Conversations and e-mail exchanges were conducted with the Executive 
Secretary and individual members of the Review Secretariat. A similar process was 
carried out with other members of the CGIAR System, including the past and present 
Chair of the Oversight Committee as well as members of the current Oversight 
Committee. 
As we got into our examination of the Third System Review, we began to think 
that the value of the process would be enhanced if we took a broader look at the larger 
CGIAR System-Wide and System-Level review processes’. System-Wide Reviews do 
not exist by themselves. Moreover, any one review is to some extent, “of its own kind”. 
It is shaped by the circumstances and the personalities of the time. The lessons drawn 
from it may not in their own right be sufficient for the future. A broader look, 
encompassing the overall System-Wide/Level review process and its implications, might 
better set the context and illuminate the complex inter-relationships involved. 
’ a) System Wide Review refers to a review that looks at the CGIAR as a System; b) System Level Review refers to a 
review that has significance for the System as a whole but is focused in one specific issue or area. 
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The assessment of how a particular System-Wide Review was organized and run 
provides an important -but only one- set or vector of lessons. Others issues that also have 
to be considered concern the need, place, and role of System-Wide Reviews more 
generally. Why are they needed? What can they be expected to accomplish? What goals 
are beyond their reach? What are their major advantages and limitations? What are the 
alternatives to System-Wide Reviews ? What role might be played by System-Level 
reviews? When are they appropriate and how might they best fit in? 
Thus, while the Third System Review was the initial focus of our review and 
evaluation, and remains at the heart of it, we have tried to put it into a larger context. In 
Chapter I, we briefly examine the Review System in the CGIAR. In Chapter II we even 
more briefly summarize the main elements of the Third System Review. A detailed 
description of both subjects is presented in Annexes 1 and 2, respectively. 
In Chapter III we highlight those issues and questions that emerge from the 
descriptive chapters which we consider of special relevance for an analysis of System- 
Wide Reviews in the CGIAR. 
In Chapter IV we analyze the special characteristics of the CGIAR as a system of 
research organizations and how those characteristics define the Review needs. We also 
review some conceptual elements that provide guidelines and impose limits on the 
objectives and organization of System-Wide Reviews. Finally in Chapter V, we present 
some recommendations that flow from our analysis. 
This more comprehensive evaluation of the System-Widekevel review process 
has stretched us a bit. Given relatively limited resources of time, it has meant that we 
have not spent as much time as we might have in looking into the details of the Third 
System Review. But we think that the trade-off -the marginal benefits compared to the 
marginal costs- is worth it, and will be of greater value to the CGIAR System. 
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PART A. THE REVIEW SYSTEM IN THE CGIAR 
I. The Overall Review System 
1. Introduction 
The CGIAR System has a rather comprehensive.system of reviews, both at the 
System-Level and the Center-level. The key elements are depicted in Figure 1. The 
diagram is drawn in terms of vertical linkages, but there are also horizontal linkages, 
though perhaps fewer than might be desired, The figure shows that traditional System- 
Wide Reviews are only a part of a much larger review process. 
2. Center Reviews 
The basic component of the review system is the review of individual Centers. 
The conduct of these reviews may be divided into two main time periods. The first period 
extended from 1976 to. 1983 when the reviews were arranged entirely by TAC. From 
1983 to the present, responsibility for one new aspect of the reviews - center management 
- has been shared with the CGIAR Secretariat. The first Center review was of IRRI in 
1976 and was followed by CIMMYT in 1976, CIAT in 1977, and IITA and ICRISAT in 
1978. Through 1997, over 70 center reviews had been conducted. 
Center-commissioned external reviews (CCERs) have long been part of the center 
management process. Although initially program-oriented, they have also grown to 
include management matters. Some are prepared in advance of the TAC reviews, in some 
cases to tidy up the shop, and increasingly have been made availab1.e to the review teams 
as reference material. They vary widely in scope, depth, and coverage and are not 
necessarily public documents. A former TAC Chair has suggested that if certain criteria 
are met, they could become “. . . a principal source of information on relevance and quality 
of science in CGIAR-commissioned external reviews.” (Winkelmann, 7/28/98). 
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3. Cross Center or Stripe Reviews 
The first System Review recommended “ . ..that the TAC give greater [sic] 
emphasis to periodic, across center analysis of particular topics (stripe analysis).” In 
subsequent years, particularly in the mid to late 199Os, a number of stripe reviews were 
carried out, for instance; off-campus training (1986), rice (1994), CGIAR center 
operations in Africa (1995), root and tuber crops (1997), soil and water natural resource 
management (1997), harvest and postharvest problems, policy management and 
institutional training (1997); CGIAR center operations in Latin America (1999), and an 
ecoregional study (1999). In retrospect, they might be said to have fallen into three 
categories: program, region, and program/region. 
4. Impact Studies 
Impact studies have grown into a big and important area. Impact studies in the 
CGIAR have gone through three basic phases. (1) In the mid-1980s, a massive impact 
study was undertaken. It originally proposed by Sweden and funded by all (?) CGIAR 
donors. It was composed of about two dozen individual studies which were summarized 
in a general publication several years later (Anderson, Herdt, and Scobie, 1988). Some 
centers conducted impact studies of various types in the following years. (2) In the mid- 
1990s there was a rebirth of interest in this topic on the part of the donors. In 1995, an 
Impact Assessment and Evaluation Group (MEG) was established. It got off to a slow 
start but in time began to pick up steam. (3) As a result of a recommendation in the Third 
System Review, IAEG became affiliated with TAC in 1999 and is now known as the 
TAC’s Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (SPIA). A number of promising studies are 
underway, both in cooperation with the individual centers and utilizing outside 
consultants. 
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5. System Level Review of Central Components on Functions 
The CGIAR and TAC Secretariats were both reviewed in the late 1980s. The 
CGIAR Secretariat was reviewed in 1987. Most of the recommendations were of a fine 
tuning nature, both within the CGIAR Secretariat and in terms of its relations with the 
TAC Secretariat. More contentious recommendations, which were not adopted, included 
the establishment of a Policy Council to advise the CGIAR Chairman; administrative 
combination of the CGIAR and TAC Secretariats, and reducing the number of science 
advisors in the CGIAR Secretariat from two to one. 
The TAC Secretariat was reviewed in 1988. Key issues examined included: 
overall performance of the Secretariat (recommended that analytical capacity be 
strengthened); location of the Secretariat (recommended staying in FAO but alleviating 
constraints which limited the Secretariat’s effectiveness and efficiency); selection of TAC 
members (suggestions for improving the process); and the need for a comprehensive 
review of TAC. Some changes that helped improve operations were subsequently made , 
but no comprehensive review of TAC was ever undertaken. 
6. Reviews of Management and Structure 
During the 199Os, four studies where carried out on these subjects. The main 
focus of each one of them was on 1) processes in the CGIAR financing structure; 2) 
governance, decision making and financing structure; 3) strategy consultation on role and 
promoting structure and linkages, funding and resource allocation and system 
management; and 4) the future of international agricultural research. 
7. System-Wide Reviews 
1) Background 
The first attempt to establish a policy on reviews was undertaken by the 
CGIAR during its meeting in November 1972 (Baurn, 1986, p. 220). 
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Subsequently, a Subcommittee on Review Procedures was established under 
the leadership of David Bell. A draft committee report was discussed during 
the November 1973 meeting on the CGIAR. The report was then further 
revised and circulated on November 5 for further comments; no further 
changes were made and the report was declared “as having the general 
agreement of Group members” on January 23, 1974. 
2) The First System-Wide Review 
This took place in 1976. It was organized on the basis of two main components: 
(1) an overall Review Committee that would make recommendations to the group, 
and (2) a Study Group. The Review Committee was headed by the Chairman of 
the CGIAR and composed of 14 members who represented a cross section of 
donors, TAC, and the centers. The Study Group was headed by Alex McCalla 
(later to serve as Chairman of TAC) and three other members. Rather broad 
Terms of Reference (TOR) were prepared. The report contained 22 
recommendations, principally relating to governance and management. 
3) The Second System-Wide Review 
During the Fall meeting (ICWSO) the group decided to undertake a second review 
of the system. This was also a period of financial stress for the centers. Baum 
notes that “ . . .in considering the scope and purpose of the review, the Group 
placed heavy emphasis on matters of governance, resource management, 
organization, and accountability. Even though the terms of reference were written 
more broadly.” 
The organization of the review was again based on 1) a Review Committee 
chaired by the Chairman of the CGIAR and composed of 18 members drawn from the 
members, and 2) a Study Team, headed by Michael Arnold and three other full time 
members and a number of consultants. 
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The report made 24 recommendations. Most focused on governance and 
management of the CGIAR and the centers. All but one were accepted by the group. The 
exception was a recommendation to establish a budget review committee. The committee 
“would make recommendations on budgetary procedures, the formulation of guidelines, 
and the allocation of resources.” This was, in Baum’s words, “. . . too radical a change for 
the group”. The group’s refusal to adopt a committee mechanism meant that it wished to 
continue to act as a ‘committee of the whole’ on “all important matters.. .“. 
Although a third review was expect to follow in approximately another five years, 
this did not happen. In anticipation of a third System Review being held, the CGIAR 
Secretariat prepared a brief discussion note on September 14, 1984, which discussed 
purpose, timing, and process. But the matter was not taken up then or for another decade. 
The major reasons, as recalled by Ozgediz (ozgediz 1996) were twofold: (1) the system 
was engaged in several major studies on other topics, and (2) “CGIAR Chairs Hopper and 
Rajagopalan preferred having internal, ad hoc examinations of aspects of the System in 
lieu of a comprehensive system review”. 
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II. The Third System-Wide Review 
1. Background 
The Third System-Wide Review was a long time coming. First contemplated in 
1984, it was put on the back burner while other more specialized System-Level reviews 
were conducted. The idea of a System-Wide Review was mentioned from time to time, 
but did not begin to take root until a decade later under a new CGIAR Chair. 
The review’s general TOR went through several iterations and, in final form, 
contained three main categories: (1) “. . . to examine, with a broad forward-looking 
perspective, the role and positioning of the CGIAR system within the rapidly changing 
global scientific, communications and institutional settings and arrangements”; (2) 
“. . .assess the CGIAR’s effectiveness in fulfilling its overall mission...“; and (3) 
“. . -assess a number of generic issues, including.. . (i) CGIAR’s strengths, past 
achievements and impact. . . (ii) CGIAR’s potential future contributions.. . 
(iii). . .partnerships, with other components of the global agricultural research system.. . 
(iv) global developments with respect to international conventions and agreements.. .” 
The TORs for the three Specialist panels that were originally proposed as part of 
the review structure, were more specific to their fields. These panels were later combined 
into two: Science and Strategy, and Governance, Structure, and Finance. In the process, 
Co-Chairs were named. 
2. Organizational Structure 
The major elements and structure are depicted on the right side of Figure 2. It 
was, by comparison with earlier reviews, a fairly complex and quite different structure. 
We have noted that the first two reviews had a Review Committee made up of 
stakeholders overseeing the work of a Study Team. These study teams were constituted 
mainly with outsiders and did all the analytical work and drafted the recommendations. 
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The Third Review had no such Committee. The review was carried out by a six-member 
panel, chaired by Maurice Strong, and two subpanels, one on Science and Strategy 
chaired by MS. Swaminatan and Bruce Alberts and one on Governance, Structure and 
Finance chaired by Whitney MacMillan. The panels were assisted by a Secretariat 
headed by Mahendra Shah. The analytical work and writing the report were done by the 
panels and to a considerable extent also by the Secretariat. 
3. Output and Outcome 
The report was made available on September 30. It was 111 pages long, and was 
composed of: an Executive Summary, 17 chapters, and five annexes. The chapters fell 
into three categories: Introductory (3), Science and Strategy (8), and Governance and 
Finance (6). Altogether, the report provided 29 recommendations and 104 sub- 
recommendations. The actual number was slightly more than this because some entries in 
both categories had several components. 
The report was in general very supportive of the CGIAR and included substantial 
and innovative recommendations. 
In general, the recommendations in the Science and Strategy chapters proved 
relatively uncontroversial. Those in the Governance and Finance category, many of 
which centered on the creation of a new, central body with legal status, proved to be more 
contentious. When the central legal body idea was questioned, many of the other 
Governance recommendations also came into question. 
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III. Reflections on the Review System 
In the preceding two sections we briefly summarized the main elements of the 
overall review process in the CGIAR and of the Third System-Wide Review, 
emphasizing those elements we consider most relevant for our analysis. In this section we 
present some observations that emerge from our own analysis and from the comments or 
observations of people we interviewed. They provide the initial stepping stones leading to 
the recommendations we present in Chapter V. 
1) The CGIAR is a complex organization and through the years it has developed a 
sophisticated review system where most organizational components are thoroughly 
reviewed. This is particularly true for Centers and less true for central governance 
components. 
2) The review system presents some weaknesses in relation to the systematic review of 
the central components that are responsible for governance activities. CGIAR and 
TAC Secretariats, and the CGIAR committees, for instance, have not been reviewed 
except on an ad hoc basis since 1980. 
3) The Center Reviews are the centerpiece of the Review process in the CGIAR. They 
are the main sources of information and transparency for the stakeholders. One 
possible shortcoming, from the perspective of this study, is that consideration of the 
interrelations of each Center being with the CGIAR System as a whole is frequently 
weak. 
4) System-Wide Reviews are an integral and important component of the review system. 
However, during its 30 years of existence, the CGIAR has experienced only three 
System-Wide Reviews. The first was in 1976, and the second in 1981 followed an 
agreed five-year cycle. The third took place only in 1998, after a 17 year lapse. 
5) The long time between the second and third System-Wide Review is partly explained 
by the heavy load of other review activities taking place during the period. On the 
other hand, the third System-Wide Review seems to have developed quite 
independently of the previous System-Wide Reviews as well as of other review 
activities that could have been better used as sources of information and analysis. 
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These reviews represent the institutional memory of the evolution, success and 
changes that the System has undergone. 
6) The three System-Wide Review have some elements in common and a number of 
important differences. These differences are specially noticeable and relevant in 
regards to the third System-Wide Review. 
7) The first two System-Wide Review had similar TORs and the recommendations 
focused on governance and management. Both reviews were the responsibility of a 
Review Committee composed of stakeholders chaired by the CGIAR Chair and was 
served by a small Study Team that worked almost full time for a period of time. 
8) The third review was quite different in focus and organization. The organization was 
based on a Panel and two Subpanels composed mainly of persons from outside the 
CGIAR and a Secretariat. The TOR emphasized the examination of the role and 
positioning of the CGIAR, its effectiveness and potential future contributions. These 
TORs were considerably more complex than those of the first and second System- 
Wide Review and were more strongly directed to an external audience. As a 
consequence, considerable attention was given to external reputation and standing in 
selecting the Chairman and the members of the main panel. However, as it turned out, 
the recommendations strongly focused on governance issues. 
9) In the first two System-Wide Review the Study team had a good knowledge of the 
organization of the CGIAR, a balanced disciplinary specialized knowledge and 
worked full time for a considerable period, developing issues and options. In the third 
review, its Secretariat, which in certain ways substituted for the Study Team, did not 
have the organizational structure and autonomy to identify issues and develop 
options. As a consequence, the responsibility for making analytical contributions and 
drawing possible recommendations were diluted between the Secretariat and the 
panels. This made the work of the Panel Chair and the review Secretariat especially 
difficult in regards to coordinating the multiple activities taking place at the same 
time and in drafting a concise and uniform final report clearly focused on the mandate 
defined in the TORs. 
10) Looking at this problem from a different perspective, it is also probably correct that 
the extended nature of the TORs, and the organizational structure adopted based on a 
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main Panel, two Subpanels, a Secretariat and a number of specialized contributions, 
led to an effort of such magnitude where diseconomies of scale probably played a 
significant role. 
11) A similar observation can be made in regards to the continuous nature of System- 
Wide Reviews and the absence of an organizational entity with the continuing 
responsibility for monitoring System-Wide Review processes. A consequence of this 
was the lack of adequate preparatory work previous to the time the panel started 
working. This preparatory work could have identified the major issues and strategic 
choices faced by the CGIAR, developed the necessary consensus among stakeholders 
on the selected issues and allowed for a more focused and acceptable set of 
recommendations. 
12) Additionally, the organizational structure used in the third System-Wide Review 
could have benefited from stronger mechanisms for systematic interaction between 
the panel and the CGIAR Stakeholders through the whole process. The mechanism in 
place, based on the communications between the Chairman of the Review Panel and 
the Chairman of the CGIAR, proved to be insufficient. It is possible that other 
CGIAR structures such as the Oversight Committee could have played a larger role in 
this function. 
13) One consequence of selecting a largely external main panel was that some of the 
recommendations were not sensitive to the long established culture of the 
organization. This fact, independently of the judgment one may have on the value of 
these recommendations, and the absence of sufficient interaction and discussion with 
the stakeholders, made it more difficult for the later to understand and accept some of 
the recommendations. 
14) System-Wide Reviews have been important elements of the review process and in the 
development of the CGIAR. The recommendations made by the first two System- 
Wide Review were, for the most part, adopted. The third review, while more 
contentious, is also having an important impact by setting in motion a number of 
activities that will most probably have an important impact on the future of the 
organization. 
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PART B. FUTURE REVIEWS: FRAMEWORKS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
IV. Concepts, Framework and Design Options 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter we seek to define the kinds of review options that we. see as 
available to the CGIAR. The chapter begins with a general consideration of review 
processes in organizations and systems. It then seeks to locate these general 
considerations within the specific context of the CGIAR. The chapter then discusses a 
number of ‘design considerations’ in terms of three main dimensions: considerations for 
review objectives; considerations for review structure and organization; and 
considerations for the process of reviews. The chapter does not make specific 
recommendations which are contained in chapter V that follows. One rationale for 
highlighting design considerations separately is to allow the readers of this report to 
consider their own preferred options and if necessary to construct their own option-set 
from the design possibilities presented. Our concern, however, is that the dimensions and 
choices are addressed, because in our judgment the lessons of previous reviews is that 
failing to make these choices can undermine the effectiveness of System-Wide Reviews 
in the CGIAR. 
2. The Contemporary Pervasiveness of Review Processes 
Institutionalized review processes are becoming increasingly common at 
organizational, policy and program levels especially in the public and public/private 
sectors, where multiple stakeholders and partnerships abound and where simple measures 
of performance such as profitability are hard to find. The ‘drivers’ for the present 
pervasiveness of reviews are especially strong when organizations and systems mature, 
when tasks become more complex, when uncertainty or the speed of change increases 
and when decision making is dispersed -either because of networks or partnerships or 
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decentralization strategies. In general, organizations today increasingly are embedded in 
an environment: they need to manage external relations and respond to external factors- 
sometimes for reasons of interdependence and sometimes for reasons of competitiveness. 
This requires intensive monitoring both of internal and also ‘cross-boundary’ processes. 
Indeed, we find that in these circumstances, the costs of routine monitoring as well as of 
less frequent reviews tends to become a more costly and time consuming component of 
organizational operations. To that extent the CGIAR needs to recognize that these 
exercises are likely to become a permanent and unavoidable organizational overhead, if 
they are to be done well. 
The wide-spread growth of evaluation, audit and quality assurance functions is 
evidence of these new and widely recognized needs. Reviews usually involve some 
explicit and systematic process of objective-setting, data-gathering, interpretation and 
recommendation. Reviews also require an implementation or follow-up process. We will 
return to these various activities below. However, it is important to recognize the extent 
and duration of a review process, one that necessarily includes preparatory and follow-up 
phases. 
Reviews at an institutional, organizational or system level are intended to fulfil 
several purposes: 
l to demonstrate accountabik’y to stakeholders that have no easy access to information 
and who value transparency; 
l to learn lessons from current practice in a systematic fashion so as to improve future 
performance; and, 
l to clarifj strategic choices and guide strategic decision making. 
Additionally, and more problematically, reviews are commonly used to address crises 
or urgent problems of a non-routine kind (e.g. to respond to a crisis or to deal with a 
funding deficit or to a change in the policy environment). These kinds of ‘survival’ 
reviews are more problematic because they are usually associated with fundamental 
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challenges to the status quo, a circumstance in which it is difficult to apply systematic 
methods in an a-political ways. In this report we concentrate on the kinds of review that 
do not focus on survival threats or crises - although we do recognize and on occasions 
also address these circumstances. 
3. The Distinctiveness of the CGIAR Context 
The System-Wide Review in the CGIAR it meant to serve all of the purposes 
identified above, but in addition is necessarily embedded in a particular and distinctive 
system (see Figure 3). 
The CGIAR is an unusual body, combining aspects of an international organization; 
research administration; a multi-purpose network of scientific, professional, donor and 
beneficiary stake-holders; and a political forum. More specifically we can highlight the 
following characteristics of the CGIAR: 
a autonomous Research Centers with their own Boards of Trustees; 
l a consultative mode of governance and decision making based on consensus and 
backed up by independent technical advice; 
l a mode of resource that combines respect for the ‘sovereignty’ of independent donors 
with a pooling of resources within priorities that are arrived at collectively; and, 
l the integration within a single framework of both donor countries and developing 
countries, including equal representation on the key boards and committees. 
The consequences of these structural characteristics include: the lack of clear and 
unequivocal lines of authority; unusual heterogeneity among the CGIAR’s key 
stakeholders; and the loosely coordinated procedure by which dispersed financial 
resources are allocated to agreed priorities. 
This diversity of form and function follows from what the CGIAR seeks to achieve in 
relation to scientific research, food security, international development and poverty 
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reduction. Because of its unusual and multi-purpose character, it faces particular 
problems of governance and coordination. It needs to maintain a consensus among many 
stakeholders and in particular to convince them that the CGIAR is efficient, well 
managed and relevant to their interests. It must, in addition, foster a strong sense of 
ownership of process and outcome which is essential to the functioning of a “system”. It 
needs to find ways of addressing strategic choices in an area of scientific research that is 
fast changing, high cost and often high risk. It needs to draw on a community of insiders 
who are usually the only knowledgeable persons in highly specialized areas of expertise. 
Nor is it only concerned with the CGIAR community: it also has to maintain credibility 
with a broader international audience that includes governments, international bodies, the 
private sector and NGOs. 
A System-Wide Review, we would argue, is one that overviews the systemic 
qualities of the CGIAR and seeks to enhance its functioning as a system. It must be 
concerned with system-wide governance, decision-making and consensus-building, 
scientific developments, the CGIAR secretariat and system-wide responsibilities of the 
Centers. In the CGIAR context, a System-Wide Review must address the demands of a 
very diverse constituency of stakeholders, including donors and beneficiaries as well as 
scientists and the private sector. It needs to contribute to learning in a non-hierarchical, 
networked context and in so doing help develop consensus as well as generate knowledge 
and understanding, per se. A review also needs to ensure that the CGIAR is prioritizing 
new needs and evident gaps rather than simply maintaining traditional patterns of activity 
and investment, while at the same time avoiding being buffeted by short term priorities 
and demands. 
4. Review Design Option 1: Objectives 
The objectives of a System-Wide Review can, as noted above, be in part deduced 
from the characteristics of the. system. At the very least it is these systemic characteristics 
that define the scope of a review. In the case of the CGIAR a System-Wide Review must 
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therefore pay attention to governance, structure, mode of finance etc. However a range of 
more specific objectives overlay this definition of the ‘scope’ of a review. 
One useful way of classifying such objectives has been put forward in the 
research evaluation literature (see Steen and Eijffinger, 1998; Rip and Van der Meulen, 
1995). We have elaborated on this classification which seems to encompass the range of 
objectives that we find in the different components of the CGIAR’s System-Wide and 
System level reviews. These objectives start from a number of criteria that are essentially 
qualitative. Thus reviews may be in terms of: 
l scientiJc quality, including the way strategic priorities are translated into research 
agendas; the originality and rigor of the research undertaken; and the research 
resources in place, in terms of both human and physical infrastructure; 
l relevance to societal needs and priorities quality, including the relevance of the 
institutional mandate and ‘of the research efforts; their responsiveness to changing 
policy priorities; and the effectiveness with which intentions are achieved and results 
are utilized; and, 
l operational quulity, including efficient implementation; the governance of the system, 
including resource allocation; and strategic priority setting for research. 
In the case of the CGIAR not all these sets of objectives are likely to be of equal 
weight or to pre-occupy the review team/panel to the same degree. 
l We would anticipate that operationaI quality is likely to be the most consistent source 
of objectives in most if not all reviews. 
l Scientific quaI@ is mainly the concern of center reviews and will only be the concern 
of System-Wide Reviews indirectly as they pick up on those aspects of center reviews 
that are of System-Level relevance. System-Level reviews will also be able to draw 
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on TAC activities regarding scientific direction and priorities. Instituting a more 
regular cycle of system reviews, as is suggested below, will also reduce the salience 
of science related objectives in any particular review. However, it is worth noting that 
the speed of scientific change varies in different periods and sometimes a System- 
Wide Review will continue to need to give attention to science objectives. 
l What has been called relevance to societal needs quality will also be a less frequent 
pre-occupation, and appropriately so, if System-Wide Reviews occur more regularly. 
In addition we would suggest that at a system-wide level in particular, a’ review 
should look for coherence across these different definitions of quality. By coherence we 
include consistency; balance; and completeness. Thus, we would wish to consider: 
l the consistency with which different parts of the CGIAR system operate: are strategic 
priorities translated into scientific programs; does governance support good science; 
and are long term scientific programs disrupted by short-term policy priorities; 
l the balance between different objectives; i.e. the extent to which appropriate 
resources are devoted to different activities; and the relationship between resources 
available and outcomes achieved and expected; and, 
l the compZeteness of the CGIAR portfolio: are there currently gaps and omissions 
either in the management arrangements, the scientific portfolio or in the way 
synergies are obtained between the CGIAR’s various activities? 
5. Review Design Option 2: Structure 
A review can be structured in many different ways. Among the most common 
design choices regarding structure are: 
l time-)ame: i.e. should a review be continuous, time-bounded or periodic; 
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l composition of the Review Panel: i.e. should a review be internalized or in some way 
externalized or out-sourced; 
l integration: i.e. should a review be a self-contained exercise or tied into other 
functions of review and governance. 
l organization and management: i.e. should a review be the responsibility of mainline 
managers, a governing body or a key role-holder such as a chairperson. 
Regarding time-frame, the classical review is periodic, occurring at discrete 
intervals, within a bounded time period. A panel is appointed and it must report by a 
certain date. Preparatory and follow-up activities are separated off from the main review 
period. This was indeed the way the first two System-Wide Reviews were conceived. The 
third review which was some 17 years after its predecessor was an extreme case of this. 
The alternative is to regard reviews as a continuous process: in today’s rapidly 
changing world, review and the feedback and action that follow are a continuous need. In 
the case of the CGIAR we have become convinced of the need for a review that is closer 
to a continuous process than has been the case hitherto -although there should be some 
differentiation between what aspects of the system are reviewed, when and how 
frequently (this is elaborated on further below). 
The notion of time-frame as used here includes at least three stages: a preparatory, 
an intensive and a follow-up stage. It is all of these that together constitute the review 
process. There are different ways by which these three stages can be designed. In Chapter 
V we make some specific recommendations2. 
Regarding the composition of the Review Panel, there is an inevitable tension 
between the need to draw on the in-house knowledge of an organization or system and 
the need to bring in new and challenging ideas. In the case of the CGIAR this tension is 
especially strong because of the unique ‘internal’ expertise that the CGIAR contains - 
’ A further dimension of the concept of a more continuous review process has been explored separately by Dana G. 
Dahymple in “The Possible Role of a CGIAR System Wide Monitor”, USAID/G/EGAD/AFS. September 15, 2000 5 
PP. 
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expertise that is probably unequalled, given the involvement of most global experts in the 
CGIAR’s areas of activity in some way. There is also the issue of credibility and the need 
to assure external audiences that a review is independent and unbiased: a function that 
also pulls for the involvement of outsiders in a review process. 
l We have come to the conclusion that at a center level, resources, independence and 
credibility are especially important. However, even here the choice may ultimately be 
between known experts who are familiar with CGIAR research and known experts 
who are also directly involved in a Center’s activities and committees. 
l At a system wide review there is probably no alternative to a stronger than usual 
internal role in the reviews of a body such as the CGIAR. Without such a strong 
internal role the best available knowledge will not be accessed and the 
implementation process is likely to be more difficult. There are various ways that an 
external voice can be incorporated. These include direct participation in panels and 
commissioned external studies or consultancies. It should nonetheless be possible to 
use external persons to certify or ensure the quality, independence and unbiased 
nature of the System-Wide Review process. These alternatives are also discussed 
further below. 
Regarding integration, a review that is periodic is usually also relatively separate 
from other in-house review activities. This is also a characteristic of the System-Wide 
Review process in the CGIAR. Yet in the CGIAR as in other contemporary 
organizations, reviews of elements of the system have become increasingly common: 
earlier parts of this report have detailed how System-Level elements are present in Center 
reviews, ‘Stripe’ reviews and other ad hoc management and governance reviews. 
What appears to be missing in the CGIAR is a closer integration of the formal and 
periodic System-Wide Reviews and these other system level reviews. This integration 
can provide a stronger basis for system wide reviews by broadening the available 
knowledge-base, extending the time period over which data is available and limiting the 
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workload demands being made of a review team or panel members. To achieve such 
integration requires some adjustment of the other System-Level review processes to align 
them with system-wide issues. For example, in the case of the CGIAR we would 
recommend that there be some adjustment of the TOR for External Program and 
Management Reviews (EPMRs) and CCERs, especially with regard to those aspects of 
center activities that pertain to the CGIAR as a system. 
Regarding organization and management there is clearly a need that the 
responsibility for System-Wide Reviews be identified in specific terms. This would. 
include initiation activities within what we have called a preparatory stage; liaison with 
the review team/panel whilst it was doing its work; and follow-up activities, in particular 
with regard to the implementation of recommendations. A, further activity within the 
review cycle that needs to be managed is confirming that the review has been completed 
and that recommendations have been addressed if not acted upon. In the CGIAR, the 
review has mainly been the responsibility of the Chair (overseeing in the case of the first 
two reviews; initiating in the case of the third review). Although it is clear that the 
CGIAR Chair will continue to need to formally authorize and endorse any System-Wide 
\ Review, in the present stage of CGIAR development there are also arguments for other 
actors - such as the Oversight Committee - that could have key roles in the organization 
and management of System-Wide Reviews. If structural changes are introduced as a 
result of the institutional processes now underway, other bodies will have to be 
considered. 
6. Review Design Option 3: Procedure 
In an earlier chapter we described a number of procedural issues that surfaced in 
the third System-Wide Review in particular, although they also featured to some extent in 
the earlier reviews. In this section these issues are re-presented in terms of a list of 
principles regarding procedure that need to be addressed in any future System-Wide 
Review. 
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. 
These procedures include: 
l Preparatory actions and review focusing. The definition of the priorities (i.e. purpose 
and focus) of a review has to be planned, authorized and in some way legitimated by 
the main CGIAR stakeholders. This is an inherent part of the review process, as it is 
ensuring that the necessary information at system level is in place and available to the 
review panel or team when it begins its work. 
l A clear statement of purpose and focus ‘expressed in the terms of reference for a 
review. No review can be entirely comprehensive and some choices will always have 
to be made. Clarity about purpose and focus will also help review teams to allocate 
their resources efficiently and other stake-holders to set realistic expectations. 
l Selection ofpersons appropriate to the task as defined in the TOR. Matching people 
to task requirements can be contrasted to an alternative that re-defines terms of 
reference to the persons chosen. Appropriate selection must also include availability 
and willingness to contribute to the review as specified. 
l Division of labor between different functions. These functions may include chair 
persons, panel members, secretariats and specialists, consultants and study teams. 
How these are defined, and responsibilities assigned, should be made very clear. 
l Modes of working. This has to include consultation processes and who is consulted 
when; the timing of meetings; the integration of different inputs;’ and how 
transparency is assured. While many of these processes can be taken for granted, it 
would probably enhance the credibility of a System-Wide Review if some standard 
operating procedures were adopted. 
l Intermediate feedback to stake-holders and role-holders. Should there be 
intermediate feedback and if so to whom? Explicit agreements as to the role of the 
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Oversight Committee, the CGIAR Chair in the -feedback process is necessary; 
acknowledging that there are arguments for and against such intermediate feedback. 
l How the final report is prepared, presented, authorized and signed o,fir To some 
extent this is a matter of timing and allowing sufficient time for finalization to occur. 
It is also a matter of setting and managing expectations among the stakeholder 
community. 
.* Follow-up procedures and implementation. We regard follow-up and implementation 
as an inherent part of the review process. The management of the dialogue that 
necessarily follows a review report and recommendations should therefore be 
considered as part of the review itself. 
In a subsequent chapter we make specific suggestions as to the way in which h 
these procedural principles might best be addressed in the case of CGIAR system level 
reviews. 
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V. Recommendations for Future System-Wide Reviews in the CGIAR 
An overall Review Process must be organized taking into consideration among 
other things the nature of the organization, its stage of development, its external 
environment, and the circumstances that surround the Review Process. In this chapter we 
summarize some of the main elements that have been developed in previous chapters of 
this report and present some recommendations that we see emerging from the arguments 
that have been developed in the main text. These recommendations address four main 
issues that define the design and characteristics of Reviews: a) The need, b) Objectives 
and focus, c) The structure and d) Procedures for implementation. The recommendations 
we make imply we have made some choices that, in our minds, are the correct ones for 
the CGIAR at present. A different set of choices could be more appropriate when 
circumstances change. 
1. The need, place and frequency of System Wide Reviews in the review system 
Complex organizations such as the CGIAR require continuing and systematic 
evaluation procedures that provide for transparency and accountability, clarify strategic 
choices, and help the organization to function in a permanent learning process. System- 
Wide Reviews are one important element of the overall review process. They are, 
however, complex and demanding institutional exercises that require intensive 
preparation and should not be overdone. On some occasions the CGIAR may be 
confronted with new problems or difficult choices on matters of great importance that 
have a system level relevance but are localized and self-contained. On these occasions, 
more limited and focused System-Level review activities may be the best way to address 
the need. The two types of reviews should draw on each other and might be grouped in 
cycles. 
. 
Recommendation 1. System-Wide Reviews are a necessary and important component 
of the overall review process in the CGIAR. They should be organized periodically as 
part of a continuous evaluation process. 
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Recommendation 2. System-Level Reviews, limited in scope and addressing specific and 
self-contained issues of system level significance, are a natural complement to ml1 fledged 
System-Wide Reviews. Both types of Reviews should be integrated into a pattern of 
evaluation procedures. As part of the preparatory activities for future reviews (see 
recommendations below) existing System-Level Reviews, Stripe Reviews, Center Reviews, 
TAC Reports and other Reviews should be collated as an input to each System-Wide Review. 
Recommendation 3. The frequency of System-Wide Reviews will depend on a number of 
circumstances and conditions, including the number and coverage of System-Level Review 
activities that are being developed. Within a flexible structure, cycles of 6 to 8 years would 
seem most appropriate. 
2. Objectives and focus of System-Wide Reviews 
System-Wide Reviews may be organized around a wide range -of objectives. The 
universe of possible objectives can be grouped in three broad categories that focus on: a) the 
operational quality of the organization; b) the scientific quality of the work being done by the 
organization; and c) quality, as societally defined relevance of the organization, which refers 
to the relevance of its work and its contributions to society. 
It seems to us that System-Wide Reviews should focus on the first category of 
objectives. Scientific quality is addressed in a number of different review activities. The 
main one is in the individual Center reviews and is a subject which is addressed on a 
permanent basis by TAC. Other activities include stripe reviews and system level review 
activities such as the one recently completed on Plant Breeding Methodologies. The strength 
of these types of reviews is built on the objectivity and independence of peer review. On the 
other hand, the evaluation of the relevance and mandate of the organization (societally 
defined quality) is a difficult and institutionally traumatic exercise. It should be developed 
with great care and prudence and only when there is a very clear indication of its need. 
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Recommendation 4. System-Wide Reviews should normally focus on the operational 
quality of the organization including governance, priority setting, and resource allocation. 
This operational quality needs to be assesed in the broader scientific and research context 
which is provided by other elements of system level reviews that are, in general, led by 
TAC. 
3. The Structure of System-Wide Review 
A review can be structured in many different ways. Among the most common 
design choices which are described in Chapter IV are: a) time frame; b) composition of 
the panel; c) integration with other review activities; and d) organization and ., 
management. On each one of these dimensions our main recommendations follow: 
Recommendation 5. Regarding time frame, System-Wide Reviews should be seen as a 
continuous process made up of three stages of different intensity: 
l A preparatory stage where issues and strategic choices are selected as the main focus 
of the review; 
l an intensive stage where the review is actually conducted; and 
l a follow-up stage, where recommendations are analyzed, institutionally internalized 
and agreed upon and later implemented. 
Recommendation 6. Regarding the composition of the Review Panel of a System Wide 
Review we think that it will need a stronger than usual participation of persons closely 
associated to the CGIAR. This will contribute to the panel having sufficient detailed 
knowledge about the System and will later facilitate the implementation process. 
Recommendation 7. On integration with other review activities we stress that other 
review activities must be adjusted to align them more closely to System-Level issues. 
Terms of reference of EPMRs should specifically consider Center activities that 
interrelate to the activities of other Centers (System-Wide activities) and on their 
28 
management implication. The definition of the Terms of Reference of System-Wide 
Reviews should carefully consider the results of all other review activities. 
Recommendation 8. Regarding who has the responsibility for the organization and 
management it seems to us that there is a need for an organizational locus within the 
CGIAR to take responsibility for system level review activities and their coordination. 
These responsibilities would include organizing and monitoring the preparatory stage, 
liaison with the review panel and follow-up activities leading to implementation. The 
Oversight Committee could have that responsibility. However, if structural changes 
within the CGIAR result from the discussions taking place at present, other 
organizational units should be considered. 
4. Procedures for the implementation of System-Wide Review 
A number of procedural issues surfaced in the analysis of the review system and 
in particular the third System-Wide Review. Procedures are quite specific to particular 
circumstances defined by time, availability of resources and opportunity. However, on 
the basis of the general principles discussed in Chapter IV, some general 
recommendations are drawn. 
Recommendation 9. Preparatory activities should be carefully organized. They should 
lead to a) well defined TOR’s endorsed by stakeholders, b) information gathering and c) a 
set of issues and questions that could be addressed by the review. 
Recommendation 10. Review focusing. The Chair of the Review panel, the Head of the 
Study Team and the Secretary to the Study Team (see Recommendation 12) should be 
appointed in advance of the review in order to facilitate preparation. The head of the 
Study Team should lead the process of internal consultation with the stakeholders and 
refining the main focus and terms of reference of the Review. The process will end with 
approval of the terms of reference by the CGIAR. 
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Recommendation 11. Terms of Reference. The review panel should receive Terms of 
Reference that include a clear and reasonably detailed statement of purpose and focus. 
This statement of focus should be built upon the issues and strategic.choices identified 
during the preparatory stage. The persons chosen to the panel and study team or 
secretariat should match the themes selected to be the focus of the review. A detailed 
Plan of Work should be developed at an initial step of the Review Process. 
Recommendation 12. The operational structure and division of labor. On the basis of 
experience to date the organization of System-Wide Reviews could adopt a structure 
made up by two components. First, a panel of 10 to 15 persons, some from inside the 
organization, partially drawn from the members of the Oversight Committee, and some 
that have independence from it and bring specialized knowledge and experience relevant 
to the specific focus of the review. Second, a study group, mainly external but with some 
knowledge of the organization and specialized professional training on subjects relevant 
to the review. The Study Group would be supported by a Secretary. 
Recommendation 13. On division of labor. The Study Group would have the 
responsibility for carrying out the substantive and analytic work required, and designing 
the’ options and opportunities confronted by the CGIAR. The Panel would have the 
responsibility for monitoring the work of the Study -Team, serving as the institutional 
mechanism for feed back and ownership development by the stakeholders and finally 
presenting the recommendations to the CGIAR. 
Recommendation 14. The process of feedback, information and development of 
ownership of the results of the review on the part of the stakeholders is a very important 
part of the whole process. The organization, budget structure and management style 
should incorporate this need in an appropriate manner. The review panel should have a 
major responsibility in the process. 
Recommendation 15. The independence and transparency of the Review process in 
relation to the different constituencies and stakeholders is important. For this reason we 
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recommend that the decisions made at each stage of the System-Wide Review are 
documented, i.e., how TOR’s were agreed on, how Panel members were chosen, what 
consultations took place, what data was collected, the process of drafting 
recommendations, and preparing and finalizing the report. Providing such an audit tra.il 
will also allow the CGIAR to go further and, if it should so wish, certify the 
independence and proper conduct of any System-Wide Review by appointing 
authoritative external “referees” or “scrutineers” who are able to review the process 
through available documentation. 
Finally, we would like to stress that the way that all these various 
recommendations come together will depend on the way they are adopted and 
implemented. It is certainly possible to imagine a future “scenario” that anticipates how a 
new System-Wide Review might work in practice. A key element of any scenario within 
the framework we are advocating is that the review process for the System-Wide Review 
of the future is explicitly differentiated into stages. This will ensure adequate preparation 
and pre-review consultation, and adequate consultation with key stakeholders that will 
need to implement the System-Wide Review recommendations before the report is 
finalized. This will, we believe, improve the efficiency of the System-Wide Review arrd 
make ownership of its recommendations by the CGIAR more likely. 
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Annex 1. THE REVIEW SYSTEM IN THE CGIAR 
1. Introduction 
The CGIAR system has a rather comprehensive system of reviews, at the System- 
Wide and System-Level, as well as the Center level. The key elements are depicted in 
Figure 1. The diagram is drawn in terms of vertical linkages, but there are also horizontal 
linkages, though perhaps fewer than might be desired. The traditional System-Wide 
Reviews are, it will be seen, only part of a much larger review process. 
These components will be briefly described in chapter I. It starts with the 
traditional, though recently infrequent, System-Wide Reviews (particularly the first two 
reviews; the third will be the subject of Annex 2) and the equally traditional individual 
Center reviews. It then moves on to a somewhat more recent and varied category of 
System-Level reviews. This is followed by some brief remarks on overlaps and gaps in 
the review system and on costs,’ benefits, and perceptions of the review system. 
Although individual components of the System side of the review process, as 
compared to the Center portion, are of major importance and interest from time to time, 
the System sector has not received as much attention as an entity. We hope that the 
broader view of the review system provided in this Annex will provide greater clarity and 
perspective to our discussion of System-Wide and System-Level components. 
2. System-wide Reviews: main elements 
A. Background 
The first attempt to establish a policy on reviews was undertaken by the CGIAR 
during its meeting in November 1972 (Baum, p. 220). Subsequently, a Subcommittee on 
Review Procedures was established under the leadership of David Bell. A draft 
committee report was discussed during the November 1973 meeting of the CGIAR. The 
report was then further revised and circulated on November 5 for further comments; no 
further changes were made and the report was declared “as having the general agreement 
of Group members” on January 23,1974. 
The report outlined a comprehensive review procedure. In the case of system 
reviews, it stated parenthetically (according to Baum, p. 99, it was thought outside of the 
terms of reference of the subcommittee): 
(The sub-committee has noted the probability that in the future the CGIAR will 
need periodically- perhaps every five years - an overall assessment of the [l] 
usefulness, [2] accomplishments, and [3] deficiencies of the system of Centers in 
the context of the worldwide problems to which the Centers’ work is addressed.) 
(p. 7 of Bell report; numbering added) 
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The report went on to suggest that “Such an overall assessment should 
presumably be prepared by, or commissioned by, the TAC.” In view of the principal 
emphasis of the report, which lay elsewhere, the subcommittee stated that “...it seems 
best to defer for the time being consideration of this additional requirement.” (p. 7) 
B. First System Review 
According to Baum (p. 99), “The need for such a full-dress review of the system 
as a whole became apparent sooner that the ‘someday’ that the subcommittee had 
envisaged.” In 1975, the CGIAR Secretariat noted that for the first time “. . . a significant 
financial shortfall appeared to be in the offing” and there was concern about how far the 
system could continue to grow. Hence, the Secretariat integrative report for the CGIAR 
meeting “recommended that a review of the system be undertaken, and a paper presenting 
a specific proposal.. .was discussed and endorsed at the October 1975 meeting” (pp. 99- 
00). 
The structure proposed had two main components: (1) an overall Review 
Committee that would make recommendations for the group, and (2) a Study Group. The 
Review Committee was headed by the Chairman of the CGIAR and composed of 14 
members who represented a cross section of donors, TAC, and the centers. The Study 
Group was headed by Alex McCalla (later to serve as Chairman of TAC) and three other 
members. A rather broad Terms of Reference (TOR) was prepared. 
The Study Team began its work in early 1976 and worked practically full time to 
the end of September (Ozgediz, p. 1). It conducted an intensive program of work 
involving travel to all parts of the system, numerous interviews, and preparation of a 
report. The Review Committee held three meetings. The final report of the Study Team 
appears to have been adopted at the October 1976 meeting, as written by the Review 
Committee. A brief summary of the CGIAR discussion, included at the beginning of the 
published report, indicated that “. . . the Report was generally cautious and conservative in 
its approach to the work of the Group over the next several years” and that some 
members “ . . .felt the need for a longer-term perspective.. .” (p. 1). 
The report contained 22 recommendations, principally relating to governance and 
management. Of these, Recommendation 14 is of most relevant to this study: 
We recommend that the CGIAR review its overall program and operation every 
three to five years. The CGIAR should appoint an ad hoc committee to conduct a 
review of [l J the substantive program of the CGIAR as well as review those [2] 
policies, procedures, and management mechanisms which require attention. TAC 
should provide a major input into this long term forward look at the substantive 
program. (p. xi, numbering added) ( 
The text of the report went on to say that: 
In addition to reviews undertaken by the TAC, there is a need for periodic review 
of [l] the overall CGIAR program and [2] of the mechanisms and management of 
the CGIAR by the CGIAR itself. The current approach of constituting a review 
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committee within the CGIAR has merit. A similar review should be conducted 
within three to five year intervals. The review committee should have the option 
of commissioning a study team or teams, if it saw the need. TAC’s 
recommendations of future program priorities would be a major input into that 
review. (p. 98, numbering added) 
C. Second System Review 
During International Centers Weeks in the Fall of 1980 (ICWSO) the group 
decided to undertake a second review of the system. This was also a period of financial 
stress for the centers. Baum notes that “ . ..in considering the scope and purpose of the 
review, the Group placed heavy emphasis on matters of governance, resource 
management, organization, and accountability. Even though the terms of reference were 
written more broadly.” (p. 145) 
The second review, as Baum notes, “ . . .was organized in much the same manner 
as the first. Once again there was a special Review Committee from within the CGIAR 
(though this time somewhat larger [IS]), and as its staff, a study team recruited from the 
outside. Funding was provided by special contributions by donors”. (p. 145). 
The Review Committee was again chaired by the Chairman of the CGIAR. It met 
three times. “The first meeting settled the scope of the committee’s task and the program 
of the study team; the second concentrated on the issues identified by the team; and the 
last addressed the draft report and recommendations prepared by the team and instructed 
the team on the revisions to be made in the final version of what then became the 
committee’s report” (p. 146, italics added). 
. 
The Study Group was headed by Michael Arnold, subsequently a member of 
TAC. It began intensive work in mid-January 1981 and completed a draft for review in 
July 1981. “Members of the study team traveled widely, to consult with donors [22], the 
directors and staffs of the centers [lo of 131, and TAC” “Several donors volunteered to 
underwrite the cost of meetings or seminars with agricultural research administrators in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America” (Baum, p. 146; numbers in brackets from Ozgediz). 
Altogether, 280 persons were interviewed (Ozgediz). 
The report provided 24 recommendations. Most focused on governance and 
management of the CGIAR and the centers. All but one were accepted by the group. The 
exception was a recommendation to establish a budget review committee. The committee 
“would make recommendations on budgetary procedures, the formulation of guidelines, 
and the allocation of resources.” This was, in Baum’s words, “. . . too radical a change for 
the group, ” “Recognizing that its refusal to adopt a committee mechanism meant that the 
group wished to continue to act as a ‘committee of the whole’ on all important matters.. .” 
(p. 149). 
Recommendation 9 referred to reviews but only included mention of “Reviews of 
the System, commissioned by the CGIAR” in a list of five types of reviews (p. xv). The 
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text, however, provided a section on “Reviews of the System” (p. 82). Two portions of 
that section bear reproduction: 
The terms of reference of these reviews have been very wide, raising the question 
of whether it is possible, in a sufficiently penetrating manner, to undertake all the 
work required in the time available. With more precise terms of reference, it 
should not be necessary for future reviews to cover the same ground as that 
covered by other mechanisms for review. Rather, the findings of other reviews 
should provide the basic information for the Review Committee and Study Team 
so that they can concentrate on the broad strategy of the System, its resources, 
organization, operational procedures, linkages with other institutions, relations 
with developing countries and the impact of its work. (p. 82, italics added) 
The guiding principles of reviews should be to avoid duplication of effort, to 
waste as little of the staffs time as possible, to produce recommendations for 
maintaining or improving the efficiency of the System and its components; and 
thereby to give continued confidence to the donors in the effectiveness of the 
system in fulfilling the purpose of the CGIAR. (p. 82) 
They then proposed some mechanisms for doing so, which were largely consistent 
with those in use but do include some changes such as building on financial and 
management audits and commodity and activity reviews (stripe reviews). 
D. Summary Comments on First and Second Reviews 
Baum summarizes the first and second reviews in these terms: 
The procedure in both cases was the same. The group established a Special 
Committee of some 15 to 18 members (plus representatives of the cosponsors) 
drawn from among the donors, beneficiary countries, the centers, and TAC to 
undertake the review, assisted by a small Study Team drawn from outside the 
system. The Study Team acted as staff for the Review Committee. It made the 
necessary recommendations, collected data, identified and analyzed issues, and 
prepared a draft report for consideration by the Committee, and after the 
Committee’s revisions, for submission to the Group in final form. The Chairman 
of the Group acted as chairman of the review committee. The terms of reference 
for both reviews, as approved by the Group, were broadly the same. (p. 224) 
A few comments may be in order about this statement. First, the role of the 
Review Committee was not as evident in the accounts of the first review as it was in the 
second review. Secondly, Baum emphasizes the relatively subordinate role of the Study 
Team though it appears to have done virtually all of the work. Thirdly, the fact that while 
the report was prepared by the Study Team, but was officially the report of the Review 
Committee, created an awkward situation at times; as Farrar - a member of both Review 
Committees - later recalled, it was “not without its critics” (1984). Fourth, there was 
considerable criticism of Baum’s role in chairing the Review Committee for both 
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reviews; it was thought by many at the time that he was too controlling and that a more 
independent chair might have been preferable. 
Although it was expected that a third review would follow in roughly another five 
years, this did not happen. In anticipation of a third review, the CGIAR Secretariat 
prepared a brief discussion note on September 14, 1984, which discussed purpose, 
timing, and process. But the matter was not taken up then or for another decade. The 
major reasons, as recalled in 1996 (Ozgediz) were twofold: (1) the system was engaged in 
several major studies on other topics, and (2) “CGIAR Chairs Hopper and Rajagopalan 
preferred having internal, ad hoc examinations of aspects of the System in lieu of a 
comprehensive system review”. 
3. System-level reviews of Centers, programs, and impact 
The CGIAR has a fairly thorough system of reviews for the Center and program 
side of its operations. Rather than describe it in detail here, we will attempt to outline its 
principal dimensions and highlight those components that are particularly relevant to 
System-Wide Reviews. We will focus on reviews commissioned by the CGIAR System 
and centers for the activities carried out under the unrestricted side of their funding. We 
will not examine the review process for special projects that are funded by individual 
donors. (A general review of the CGlAR planning, review and evaluation process is 
provided in Anderson and Dalrymple, 1999, chp. 4, pp.. 35-47.) 
A. Center Reviews 
These are of two main types: (1) those set by, and carried out by, the CGIAR 
System and (2) those carried out on a voluntary basis by individual centers. 
(1) CGIAR Reviews 
The conduct of CGIAR reviews of individual centers may be divided into two 
main time periods. The first period extended from 1976 to 1983 ,and the reviews were 
arranged entirely by TAC. From 1983 to the present, responsibility for one new aspect of 
the reviews - management - has been shared with the CGIAR Secretariat. 
(a) 1976-l 983. The individual Center reviews grew out of the recommendations 
of the Bell Committee in 1973: 
The CGIAR needs periodic independent external assessments of the overall 
scientific quality and effectiveness of each Center, and of the continuing need for its 
work, with special emphasis of the need to ensure that activities are not continued longer 
than necessary, and that activities of lower priority are replaced by those of higher 
priority. Such assessments are not appropriate on an annual basis, but should be 
scheduled no less frequently than every five years. Such assessments are equally needed 
by the centers themselves, and it is the practice of the centers to organize them...The 
CGIAR looks to TAC to assure that such periodic assessments are made.. .If the TAC 
. 
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considers it necessary, it can lay on a special assessment process separate from that 
organized by the Center for its own purposes. (‘p. 4) 
The first such review was of IRRI in 1976 and was followed by CIMMYT in 
1976, CIAT in 1977, and IITA and ICRISAT in 1978. Through 1997, over 70 Center 
reviews had been conducted. 
Thefirst system review conducted in 1976 commented as follows (excerpts): 
The quinquennial reviews initiated this past year show much promise. ..The 
reviews should be concerned with three principal tasks: (1) to evaluate the 
scientific quality of current programs, (2) to comment on the scope and balance of 
current programs, and (3) to evaluate future plans including the explicit review of 
center proposals to continue projects of long standing. Clearly, the onus should be 
on the centers to justify continuance. 
The...reviews should be planned well in advance, giving the TAC time to 
establish a high quality review committee which can be briefed well in advance 
and allow centers time to carefully develop their long-range future plans. The 
reviews should be analytic and probing in their treatment of programs, 
particularly regarding the relative distribution of efforts within center programs. 
To date, reviews have tended to focus on current programs and generally have 
recommended more of everything. (p. 97) 
Recommendation 15, not surprisingly, proposed “.. .continuation of the TAC 
quinquemrial reviews for the evaluation of scientific quality, scope, and balance of 
current programs, and to evaluate future plans, including explicit review of center 
proposals to continue programs of long standing.” (‘p. xi) 
(b) 1983-Present. The second System Review in 198 1, in commenting on the 
review process, stated: 
According to some donors, the greatest deficiency in the review process is the 
need for more penetrating reviews of the administration and management of the 
institutions, particularly in relation to cost-effectiveness and accountability. The 
questions to be resolved are the extent to which management reviews should be 
combined with program reviews, and whether they should be the responsibility of 
TAC or some other component of the System. 
The requirement to examine management effectiveness has already been built into 
the terms of reference drawn up by TAC for external review panels. The 
thoroughness of these management reviews has varied widely, however, and in 
only one instance has the panel penetrated deeply into administrative procedures. 
What many donors would like to have included in the review process would be a 
thorough audit of management, organization and operating procedures in order to 
give greater “transparency” to the operation of the Institutions. (p. 77) 
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The review, therefore, felt that “Additional mechanisms are...required” (p. 78). 
Two were proposed: (1) the appointment of a senior management specialist to offer 
assistance to the centers on administrative and management matters, and (2) that titure 
external reviews “ . ..should include a management audit to be commissioned by the 
CGIAR Secretariat and to be conducted sometimes by the proposed staff member, 
sometimes by an external consultant and, where necessary, by a combination of both.‘: (p. 
79). 
Initially, these reviews were carried out somewhat separately, though generally at 
the same time, as the program review; they were also published separately. More 
recently, they became a more integral part of the overall review and the final report. 
One problem with this package is that it places a five-year interval between 
reviews. Problems, especially of a management nature, may well flare up more frequently 
than this. Some kind of improved monitoring system may be needed between reviews. It 
is, however, difficult to conceive of a system that could do the job without being 
intrusive3. 
(2) Center-Sponsored Reviews 
As noted above, Center-commissioned external reviews (CCERs) have long been 
part of the center management process. Although initially program-oriented, they have 
also grown to include management matters. Some are prepared in advance of the TAC 
reviews, in some cases to tidy up the shop, and increasingly have been made available to 
the review teams as reference material. They vary widely in scope, depth,.and coverage 
and are not necessarily public documents. A former TAC Chair has suggested that if 
certain criteria are met, they could become “ . . .a principal source of information on 
relevance and quality of science in CGIAR-commissioned external reviews.” 
(Memorandum by Winkelmann, 7/28/98). 
B. Cross-Center or Stripe Reviews . 
The first System Review recommended “ . . .that the TAC give greater [sic] 
emphasis to periodic, across center analysis of particular topics (stripe analysis).” (p. ix). 
The review’s text comments on this issue were as follows: 
TAC should continue [sic] periodic across-center analysis of particular internal 
program components such as training, documentation, cropping systems research, 
etc. These “stripe” analyses would be useful to TAC and the CGIAR in 
maintaining an overview of the system and also would provide a useful 
mechanism for centers to compare their different program components and learn 
from each other. They are termed analyses rather than reviews because we would 
not like to see them become mechanisms that encourage conformity. (p. 97) 
3 This issue is discussed by Dana Dahymple in “Improved Monitoring of CGIAR Center Operations”, 
USAIDIGIEGADIAFS, April 1, I997,5 pp. 
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The term sic was added to the quote because no reviews, to our knowledge, had 
been completed at that time. One, however, may have been in the works: a review of 
farming systems research at four Centers which was completed in 1978. No others were 
carried out until about the time of the second review. 
The second System Review stated that: “In our opinion, the concept of Stripe 
Analyses should be extended to include a review of the work of the system on a major 
commodity or activity. Accordingly, we suggest that the term ‘Stripe Analysis’ should be 
discontinued and replaced by ‘Commodity Review’ or ‘Activity Review’, as 
appropriate.” (p. 77). They went on to say that: 
Reviews that focus on a single commodity or activity could supplement external 
reviews of the Institutions in several ways. As we have seen.. .they would provide 
opportunities for reviewing, more completely, programs hat have common 
elements in the work of two or more institutions. Moreover, they could examine 
the mechanisms for coordinating work in the same region, both administratively 
and scientifically.. .In addition, they could provide a better basis for planning the 
level of support to be accorded to a particular commodity or activity within the 
System as a whole. @. 80). 
In subsequent years, particularly in the mid to late 199Os, a number of stripe 
reviews were carried out: off-campus training (1986), rice (1994), CGIAR center 
operations in Africa (1995), root and tuber crops (1997), soil and water natural resource 
management (1997), harvest and post harvest problems, policy management and 
institutional training (1997), CGIAR center operations in Latin America (1999), and an 
ecoregional study (1999). In retrospect, they might be said to have fallen into three 
categories: program, region, and program/region. 
While the stripe reviews to date have all been commissioned by TAC and have 
been oriented to programs, there is no reason why similar studies could not be 
commissioned in the governance and management area. This area, however, has been 
approached - as we will see in a subsequent section - in a somewhat different way by the 
CGIAR. 
C. Impact Studies 
This is a large an important area but will only get brief mention here (further 
details are provided in Anderson and Dalrymple, 1999, pp. 41-46). Suffice it to say that 
the CGIAR has gone through three basic phases: (1) The first was a massive impact 
study, originally proposed by Sweden and .h.mded by CGIAR donors, in the mid-l 980s. 
It was composed of about two dozen individual studies which were summarized in a 
general publication several years later (Anderson, Herdt, and Scobie, 1988). Some 
Centers conducted impact studies of various types in the following years. (2) In the mid- 
1990s there was a rebirth of interest in this topic on the part of the donors. In 1995, an 
Impact Assessment and Evaluation Group (IAEG) was established. It got off to a slow 
start but in time began to pick up steam. (3) As a result of a recommendation in the third 
System Review, IAEG became affiliated with TAC in 1999 and is now known as TAC’s 
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Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (SPIA). A number of promising studies are 
underway, both in cooperation with the individual centers and utilizing outside 
consultants. 
4. System-Level reviews of central components and functions 
The anticipated third System Review, which might have been held during 1986, 
did not take place at that time. This was partly because the System was engaged in some 
other major reviews, and in part because the Chairmen of the time, as stated “, . .preferred 
having internal, ad hoc examinations of the System in lieu of a comprehensive review” 
(Ozgediz). The key activities during this period, which extended through the initiation of 
the third system review in the mid-l 99Os, will be briefly outlined in this section; they will 
be grouped by category and are not necessarily in chronological order. All, however, 
tended to focus on key Center components and relationships in the CGIAR System; these 
are depicted in Figure 2. 
A. Reviews of Secretariats 
Both the CGIAR and TAC Secretariats were reviewed in the late 1980s. 
(1) CGIAR Secretariat 
In November 1987, CGIAR Chairman Hopper appointed an “Oversight 
Committee” to “ . . .advise him on the roles and performance of the CGIAR Secretariat.” 
Robert Herdt was named Chairman of the Committee, which had had 15 other members 
drawn from what would now be considered “stakeholders”. Two meetings were held, in 
March and July, and a report was submitted on September 15. Most of the 
recommendations were of a fine tuning nature, both within the CGIAR Secretariat and in 
terms of its relations with the TAC Secretariat. More contentious matters, which were not 
adopted, included suggestions for a Policy Council to advise the CGIAR Chairman, 
administratively combining the CGIAR and TAC Secretariats, and reducing the number 
of science advisors in the CGIAR Secretariat from two to one. One donor urged merger 
of the two secretariats and sharing their budgets among all donors. 
(2) TAC Secretariat 
The following year, a panel, headed by Emil Javier (currently The TAC Chair), to 
review the TAC Secretariat. Seven panel members were named, again from the 
“stakeholder” community (including Dana Dalrymple). The panel conducted its work in 
the winter and spring of 1998, with meetings in February and March. Key issues 
examined included: overall performance of the Secretariat (recommended that analytical 
capacity be strengthened); location of the Secretariat (recommended staying in FAO but 
alleviating constraints which limited the Secretariat’s effectiveness and efficiency); 
selection of TAC members (suggestions for improving the process); and the need for a 
comprehensive review of TAC. Some changes were subsequently made that helped 
improve operations, but no comprehensive review of TAC was ever undertaken. 
4.5 
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B. Reviews of Management and Structure 
Two rather closely related reviews were conducted in the early 1990s. 
(1) Deliberation and Decision-Making Processes 
A Working Group to examine processes was appointed by CGIAR Chair 
Rajagopalan at the May 1992 meeting of the CGIAR. It was also headed by Robert Herdt 
and included four members. A report was presented the following May. It provided ten 
recommendations. Four related to CGIAR meetings. Four related to the establishment of 
new committees and structures: a standing committee on finance; a standing committee 
on System-Level evaluation [need to check text of document on this]; a single mechanism 
for public awareness; and “. . . a regional roundtable format. ..for reflecting views of 
developing country agricultural researchers within the CGIAR”. These proposals were 
largely adopted. 
(2) Long-Term Governance and Financing Structure 
Two years later, in July 1994, CGIAR Chair Serageldin appointed a Study Panel 
to “ . ..recommend a future governance, decision-making, and financing structure and 
mechanisms for the CGIAR.” The Panel was headed by Klaus Winkel and included six 
members. It met twice, in August and September 1994. The Panel’s recommendations fell 
into four areas: research agenda setting; governance, operating system, and funding. 
Perhaps the most visible results were the recommendations for the establishment of: (a) 
the Global Forum; and (b) “... the mounting of a system wide effort.. .to develop 
systematic and continuous processes for impact assessment, to supplement existing 
processes. _ .” 
C. Review Processes 
Two efforts were undertaken in this category in 1997 and 1998. 
(1) Study of External Review Processes 
A study of review processes at the center level was undertaken by Prof. Vernon 
Ruttan at the joint request of TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat. It was intended to be a 
first step in the reconsideration of these policies. The report, completed in April 1987, 
had two rather distinct parts; a fairly concise general report containing ten 
recommendations, and a highly detailed annex. The report was considered at the May 
1987 meeting of the CGIAR and four of the recommendations eventually became part of 
the CGIAR review procedure. They were: placing more emphasis on strategic issues; 
giving more attention to internal review processes by the center; making provision for 
interim reviews; and including an assessment of the Boards. TAC, however, thought that 
“...a satisfactory plan for changes in the approach to reviews would have to go beyond 
the areas covered by Ruttan in some respects, notably in relating the reviews to the 
resource allocation process.” 
(2) Study of Review Processes in the CGIAR 
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The Ruttan paper served as a backdrop for the preparation of a more 
comprehensive report by TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat. An early draft was distributed 
to the CGIAR for discussion at its fall 1987 meeting, subsequently revised, and circulated 
again at the fall 1998 meeting. It covered: center-specific reviews, inter-center reviews, 
and System-Level reviews. The latter section is of particular relevance to this study. The 
summary and text state as follows: 
In the light of the more frequent System-Level studies.. .the distinctions between 
System-Level planning and reviews of the System are becoming more blurred. 
There is a need for both, but doing both frequently could lead to a system 
overload. (p. 2) 
Any institution with the size, complexity and dynamism of the CGIAR would, on 
occasion, benefit from a comprehensive examination of its effectiveness and 
efficiency. The need for such reviews lessens when there are no apparent threats 
to the System (such as a drastic cut in funding), when the system is undergoing 
major change, or when there are indications that the system is operating properly. 
(p. 24). 
The report also goes on to comment on the insider/outsider tradeoff in staffing 
reviews: 
The experience, understanding and corporate memory within the CGIAR System 
can rarely be matched by individuals outside it. There are therefore greater costs 
associated with examination of intra-System concerns by outsiders than those in 
the System. However, outsiders often bring fresh perspectives and are often 
perceived as being more objective. 
There is merit in relying heavily on talent within the System in conducting ad hoc 
reviews of the elements of the System because these individuals often represent 
the clients of the component being examined. Using this principle seems to have 
worked well in the examination of the CGIAR Secretariat and could work equally 
well in the examination of other elements of the System. (p. 24) 
The Appendix of the report provides a matrix that distinguishes, at the System 
level, between (a) comprehensive System reviews, and (b) ad hoc examination of 
components of the System. 
D. Donor-Sponsored Reviews 
While many donors have conducted reviews of special projects they have funded 
at individual Centers, only a few have sponsored System-Wide studies in response to 
their own needs. Two will be briefly mentioned here4. 
4 Several studies were also sponsored by the InterAmerican Development Bank fairly early on: the last one concerned 
funding of CGIAR activities. We do not, however, have these at hand. 
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The first study was by SAREC of Sweden, the agency that provides funding for 
international research activities. In 1977, it issued a report on Past, Present, and Future 
Swedish Support to International Agricultural Research (SAREC Report No. R:2). 
Several others followed on issues less closely related to the CGIAR. It, however, was 
specifically covered.in a 1994 report titled Swedish Support to the Consultative Group on 
International Research (CGIAR), A Quinquennial Review 1987-1992 (Evaluation 
1994:l). 
As part of a more general study of the Bank’s Special Grant Program conducted 
by the Operations Evaluation Division in 1998, Anderson and Dalrymple prepared a 
comprehensive report on The World Bank, the Grant Program, and the CGL4R; A 
Retrospective Review (OED Working Paper Series No. 1, March 1999). It provides fairly 
comprehensive coverage of the CGIAR, its contributions and the Bank’s involvement. It 
also discusses CGIAR review and impact assessment processes. 
E. Strategy and Vision 
This- category includes two rather different activities, the first on strategy and the 
second on vision. 
(1) Strategy Consultation 
During the fall meeting of the CGIAR in 1991, there was an interest in redefining 
a system-wide strategy. It was thought that a synthesizing exercise by a small group could 
move the process along. Consequently CGIAR Chairman Rajagopalan convened a 
consultation in London in February 1992. Walter Falcon served as moderator. Four main 
issues were discussed: role and priorities, structure and linkages, funding and resource 
allocation, and system management. A detailed summary report was prepared and 
distributed by the Chairman on February 24, 1992. Under the governance section, there is 
a one-line entry: “Maybe it is time for another review of the System.” (p. 41) ; nothing 
further was found on this point. Falcon made a summary presentation revolving around 
ten points at the spring meeting of the CGIAR. As a component of one of these, he 
“. . . suggested that the CGIAR system badly needs a new crisp 1 S-page statement pointing 
to the future.” (Summary of Proceedings, p. 3). He also commented that “some of the 
problems noted could be handled by the establishment of an executive committee.” In the 
absence of such a group, “everything falls to TAC.” (p. 4). 
(2) Vision Report 
In its fall 1993 meeting, the CGIAR decided to commission an expert panel to 
prepare a future of international agricultural research. The panel was headed by Gordon 
Conway and included three other members and several consultants. It was published, 
with the support of the Swedish government, in an attractive format in July 1994. It was 
very well received (though at 74 pages exceeded the 1 5-page suggestion of Falcon). 
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F. Summary Comments 
Clearly the period from 1988 through 1994 demonstrated an alternative path to 
the System-Wide Reviews that had preceded it. Ad hoc reviews of components of the 
System, such as governance and management, were the order of the time. They appear to 
have been done at relatively little direct cost, and many of their recommendations were 
adopted. Whether these processes could be repeated at this time is uncertain. It also must 
be acknowledged that this approach would not work for every topic or meet every need. 
It might not work well where considerable research or travel is needed. It also does not 
produce a big splash type of product. Still, it demonstrates that an alternative path may be 
possible for some review activities. 
5. Overlaps and gaps in the review system 
As noted earlier, the CGIAR System has sometimes been accused of being over- 
planned and over-reviewed. One might, therefore, expect the System to have far more 
overlaps than gaps. That may be true at the Center level, where external program and 
management reviews are held about every five years and where donors of restricted 
funding (special projects) may require reviews more frequently. And the Centers may be 
caught up in various more general System-Level reviews. But at the S’stem level, our 
perception is that despite the seemingly numerous component review activities discussed 
in the previous section and aside from the rather heavy demands imposed by the Third 
System Review (to be discussed in Annex 2), the situation is rather different. We see 
many more gaps than overlaps. This will become more apparent as we define the gaps 
more fully. 
A. Overlaps 
We should perhaps start by distinguishing between the science /technology side 
and the governance/management side. The former is the province of TAC and its 
activities seemed to be managed to reduce overlap. On the management/governance side, 
about the only apparent areas of overlap might be where the System-Level Review takes 
up some of the issues covered in the component reviews mentioned in the previous 
section. This, however, is more to be desired than dismissed. The review process should 
be cumulative and build on previous work. In our view the Third System Review, to be 
discussed in Annex 2, did not sufficiently do so. 
B. Gaps 
(1) Review Structures 
The scientific and technical side of the CGIAR is well served by the TAC. And, 
as we have seen, provision has long been made for a governance dimension in the 
periodic external reviews of the centers. But there is no comparable mechanism for 
review of governance and management of the CGIAR system on a regular basis. 
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Two important pieces are in place - the OC and the Management Advisor (MA) 
in the CGIAR Secretariat - but they do not begin to have the level of resources available 
through TAC. The OC is composed of donor representatives who usually meet twice a 
year for a day or so. The Chairs of this group usually have many responsibilities in their 
home organization and are normally not in a good position to put in a lot of time on OC 
matters between meetings. The OC is served by the MA, but that person -no matter how 
capable- also has many other duties with respect to the Centers and in other areas. The 
OC, therefore, largely devotes its efforts to identifying and commenting on immediate 
issues of concern. It does not have the capacity or the financial resources (it has no 
regular budget) to initiate or carry out studies of the sort routinely handled by TAC. 
As a result, as Falcon was quoted as saying in the previous section, “everything 
falls to TAC.” Recent examples include the study of the expansion of the CGIAR System 
in 199 1 and currently the Vision statement and examination of the CGIAR structure and 
governance. While TAC has some very talented members, it cannot be said that they 
necessarily have a comparative advantage in these areas. The OC is involved to some 
degree, but the heavy lifting is left to TAC. 
(2) Review of Central Components 
While the System Reviews (including the third) have given some attention to 
central components, they have received more sporadic coverage in terms of component 
reviews. Some individual reviews of central components have, as noted in the previous 
section, been carried out in the past, but other components have been overlooked or not 
covered in some time. The overlooked components are, to start at the top, the Chairman, 
the co-sponsors, TAC as a whole, and the CGIAR Committees’. The CGIAR and TAC 
Secretariats have not been examined since the late 1980s. Some components may be 
more appropriately covered in a System-Wide Review (particularly higher-level 
components) and others may be more amenable to a component-type review. 
(3) Temporal Dimension 
The frequency of reviews is an important but often overlooked topic. While it was 
initially thought that the System-Wide Reviews would be conducted every five years, this 
was only true of the first two reviews; thereafter, there was a 17-year interval. The 
component reviews have been ad hoc in nature: they followed no particular pattern and 
are generally one of a kind. While many important matters have been covered, there has 
been no apparent master plan or sequence. With the advent of the OC, there has been an 
oversight function, but even this is somewhat tied to the cycle of CGIAR meetings. The 
Management Advisor can follow matters on a more regular basis, but is clearly inside the 
system. What may be needed is some means for maintaining a more external review of 
operations of the system. 
’ The Third System Review did provide some descriptive material on the Committees in Annex I (pp. 98-101) and 
some analytical comments on effectiveness (based on a survey) in Annex II (pp. 102-105). 
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6. Costs and benefits of the review system 
Clearly, the CGIAR System gives a great deal of attention to the review process. 
Portions of the review process, especially at the Center level, have been in place since the 
mid- 1970s and appear to be well organized and developed. Other portions, especially at 
the System level, appear to be more ad hoc in nature and are subject to some gaps in 
coverage. Two models of the latter have evolved: the System-Wide Review and the 
System-Level or component review. 
A. Costs 
Reviews entail both direct (cash) and indirect costs (time of centers, secretariats, 
donors). At the Center level, direct costs, as noted previously, ran about $300,000 in the 
late 1990s (excluding costs of center-commissioned reviews and reviews of restricted 
fund projects) and are paid for by the center; indirect costs may be about 75% of this 
figure (Anderson and Dalrymple, p. 47). The System-Wide Reviews had higher direct 
costs: about $0.5 million for the second review (Ibid.) and about $1.65 million for the 
third review and report. The direct costs of the first two reviews were paid by 
contributions from donor members, while the costs of the third review were taken out of 
the World Bank contribution to the CGIAR. Indirect costs are not known, but were 
probably fairly high for the third review (for reasons we shall see in Annex 2). The costs 
of the System-Level reviews noted in Section 4 are also not known, but are generally 
thought to be quite low; indirect costs, however, may have been relatively higher (the 
time involved, in many cases, was donated). The impact assessment studies and reviews 
are an additional cost, and no effort has been made to try to track them here. 
B. Benefits 
Benefits of the reviews might be classified into two types: internal and external. 
Internal benefits, briefly, relate to increased efficiency/effectiveness/productivity of the 
System or Center. External benefits, briefly, relate to meeting donors needs and 
improving public relations. The first two System-Wide Reviews fell principally into the 
internal category; the third review was more difficult to classify. 
However internal and external goals are interrelated. Achievement of internal 
goals can increasingly be useful on the external front: donors and those they depend on 
for funding need to be assured that the System and the Centers are cost-efficient. And the 
need to better achieve external goals can be a useful prod in achieving internal goals. 
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Annex 2. THE THIRD SYSTEM-WIDE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
The Third System Review was, as we have shown, a long time coming. First 
contemplated in 1984, it was put on the back burner while other more specialized 
System-Level reviews were conducted. The idea of a System-Wide Review was 
mentioned from time to time, but did not begin to take root until a decade later under a 
new CGIAR Chair. 
The story of the Third Review is a complicated one and we cannot claim to have 
explored it completely. Two of us experienced it personally, but in different ways-one 
as a donor representative and another as a Board Chair. We have also reviewed the 
written records and communicated with some participants. While this process, especially 
the personal interactions, was not as complete as it might have been, it gave us a 
reasonably good fix on the,process aspects of the review 
This Annex, therefore, attempts to focus on selected aspects of the review that 
may be most relevant to evaluation of process issues that could be important in the future. 
The first section outlines the principal steps in the process in chronological order and is 
descriptive. The following sections attempt to look at various aspects of the review from 
a more analytical, and then increasingly subjective, point of view. 
2. Principal steps 
This section provides a chronological reconstruction of the principal steps in 
setting up, conducting, and responding to the Third Review. 
A. Prelude and Preparation 
(1) 1995 
In January 1995, the CGIAR held a Ministerial-Level Meeting on Renewal of the 
CGIAR in Lucerne, Switzerland. The, idea of a System-Wide Review was not on the 
program nor was mentioned in the records of the meeting, but the representative of a 
Canadian-American NGO, RAFI, actively campaigned for such a review on the side7. 
Whatever the outcome in Lucerne, at the spring (MTM) meeting of the CGIAR in May 
1995, the Oversight Committee briefly analyzed the need and opportunity for a System 
Review. The CGIAR Chairman suggested that a review be held after the renewal process 
was completed, possibly in 1996 or 1997. The Chairman again commented on the review 
at the fall meeting of the CGIAR (ICW) and placed it on the agenda for the OC in 1996. 
In neither case was there any discussion nor action by the CGIAR membership. 
7 In a letter to Pat Mooney of RAF1 on January 20, the CGIAR Secretariat said “‘As an innovative institution, the 
CGIAR does not tie itself down to one single form of review in perpetuity.” 
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(2) 1996 
The pace picked up in 1996. At the MTM in May, the idea was discussed by the 
OC and in plenary. The report of the OC meeting said that the group had interactions with 
“several CGIAR constituencies” and “they would welcome a review of the system” (p.3). 
The OC thought that the review should have a broad scope, be conducted by “a small 
team of independent, external individuals of strong credibility and stature,” and that a 
committee of stakeholders “should appoint the panel and oversee the process” (p.4). In 
plenary, the concept of a review was endorsed by Germany and the Netherlands. 
That summer, an OC working group prepared a preliminary prospectus that was 
sent to stakeholders on August 5. The cover note from the CGIAR Chair indicated that 
the OC “ . ..does not wish to steer or coordinate the review process, as this is a role the 
Committee does not consider as being part of its mandate. Instead, the OC.. . would like 
to work with others towards mounting an independent, objective, transparent and 
interactive review.” He went on to say “I am interested in hearing from you whether an 
ad hoc Stakeholder Committee or other ad hoc consultation mechanism should be 
involved in the preparation of the review, particularly in the selection of the review 
panel.” The attached synopsis of OC views included: purpose (“To provide the CGIAR 
with an independent assessment of the role and relevance of the CGIAR system and to 
improve its effectiveness”), principles, scope, possible issues, modality, profile of the 
review panel, support mechanism, timing, budget (“under $500,000”), appointment and 
coordination process, and role of the OC. 
On October 16, the Chairman sent a letter to “Cosponsors and Stakeholders 
Group” outlining his proposals for the review. His note introduced two additional 
dimensions to the review: “First, the review should take the CGIAR’s mission as a 
‘given’ and examine how successful the System has been in carrying out this mission and 
what it needs to do to further strengthen its performance. ” “Second, as the main business 
of the CGIAR is science, the review team should outline for us the scientific challenges 
that the System will need to address in the 2 1” century as well as give us an opinion on 
the quality and relevance of the science practiced at the centers. In addition, the team 
should examine, at a minimum, the System’s strategy, structure, governance, and 
finance.” The attached note, prepared in the CGIAR Secretariat, laid out the “modality” 
of the review: “The Panel would be supported by three Working Groups, appointed to 
conduct detailed reviews of the three areas of the review [science, strategy and structure, 
governance, and finance]. Each Working Group would be chaired by a member of the 
Review Panel and made up of three to four experts, including the chair.” Their work 
“would be facilitated by a small secretariat.. .” The cost was placed at “about $750,000” 
and was expected to be “covered by CGIAR member?. 
During ICW later that month, further discussions were held with stakeholders, 
heads of delegations, and in plenary (comments were provided by four members). The 
’ Dana Dalrymple subsequently wrote in an internal memo that “The price for this compromise is a rather large, 
probably overly comprehensive, and certainly expensive structure” (October 19). The cost of the review subsequently 
doubled. 
TOR were discussed and names of prospective panel members and a task director were 
requested. Following the presentation of the Sir John Crawford lecture by Maurice Strong 
(“The CGIAR at Twenty Five; Looking Back and Looking Forward”) on October 28, the 
CGIAR Chair asked him to serve as Chairman of the review; his name was mentioned in 
the plenary meeting on November 1. 
(3) 1997 
Preparations continued during the first half of 1997. The review was discussed by 
the OC in January. In February, the CGIAR Chair sent Strong a letter providing a revised 
TOR and a list of possible members of review team panels. In April, the CGIAR Chair 
met with stakeholders about the review and sent a letter to Mahendra Shah - who was 
selected by the Review Chair - acknowledging his acceptance of the Executive Secretary 
position’. In May, the CGIAR Chair sent a letter to heads of delegations, which contained 
a section on the review; he also announced composition of the Review Panels. About the 
same time, CGIAR committee chairs were asked to prepare briefing papers. A status 
report was prepared for MTM. At MTM later in the month, there was a discussion by the 
OC, and a video presentation by Strong. 
The Terms of Reference were first drafted by the CGIAR Secretariat (in part 
drawing on comments made by the OC at its January meeting) early in the year and 
remained the same until the Review Team began its activities in August. As initially 
expressed in an attachment to a letter from the CGIAR Chair to the Review Chair (2/4), 
the general task was: 
. . .to assess the CGIAR’s effectiveness in fulfilling its overall mission of 
contributing, through its research, to promoting to sustainable agriculture for food 
security in developing countries, and to make recommendations for 
improvements. The Panel is asked to conduct its examination with a broad, 
forward-looking perspective, focusing, in particular, ‘on the future role of the 
CGIAR system within the rapidly changing global scientific, communications, 
and institutional settings and arrangements. It should pay particular attention to 
the evolving capacities of national agricultural research systems in developing 
countries, NGOs, and the private sector; the comparative advantages of various 
actors; the organization and management of research; and the need for 
strengthening research partnerships. 
The TOR went on to state that the Panel is expected to conduct detailed 
examinations of at least the following three subjects 
1. Science. Key issues include: the role and positioning of the CGIAR within the 
global agricultural research system; the most important scientific challenges 
the CGIAR should aim to address in the future; and appropriateness of the 
type and quality of science practiced at the CGIAR centers. 
9 The CGIAR Secretariat originally proposed that there be an open search for the Executive Secretary. 
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2. Priorities, Strategies, and Structure. Key issues include: important gaps or 
redundancies in the CGIAR’s current coverage of scientific activities; 
appropriateness of CGIAR policies on key issues such as genetic resources 
and intellectual property rights; and structure of the Center system and 
efficiencies that could be achieved by better deploying existing resources, 
taking into account opportunities for new partnerships. 
3. Governance and Finance. Key issues include: the CGIAR’s own governance 
arrangements, including the systemwide committees and units and their roles; 
effectiveness of the CGIAR’s internal decision processes for priority setting, 
resource allocation, and evaluation; and arrangements for financing the 
activities of the centers. 
Curiously, the report of the OC meeting held on May 24 stated that: 
There are three key issues the review should focus on: Eficiency of conducting 
business in the CGIAR, including the efficiency of governance, research 
processes and approaches and center administration; Impact of the CGIAR, 
including the focus, relevance, and quality of the CGIAR’s work and the 
effectiveness of its impact assessment systems; and Support for the CGIAR, 
including its constituencies and partners, and how the CGIAR works with others, 
CP. 4). 
This is a somewhat less visionary stance than they took in the report of their 
January meeting which emphasized “The future role and position of the CGIAR and the I 
IARCs in the global agricultural research system.. .” (p. 2) 
B. The Review Process 
The review process itself might be said to have lasted, in a formal sense, from July 
7, 1997, when the Secretariat office was opened, until November 15, 1998, when the 
Secretariat office was closed. Actually Shah began work before July 7 and continued long 
after November 15. 
(1) 1997 
The principal events during the remainder of 1997 were the first Working Group 
meeting in Washington (August 25-27) and the first Review Panel meeting in 
Washington (October 27-29). Revised TORs for the Main Panel and the three Subpanels, 
developed during the August meeting, were provided on September 4 and the review was 
discussed at ICW (October 27-3 1). 
The revised general TOR contained three main categories: (1) “. . .to examine, with 
a broad forward-looking perspective, the role and positioning of the CGIAR system 
within the rapidly changing global scientific, communications and institutional settings 
and arrangements”; (2) “. . . assess the CGIAR’s effectiveness in fulfilling its overall 
mission.. .“; (3) “ . . .assess a number of generic issues, including.. . (i) CGIAR’s strengths, 
past achievements and impact.. . (ii) CGIAR’s potential future contributions.. . 
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(iii). . .partnerships, with other components of the global agricultural research system.. . 
‘L.. (iv) global developments with respect to international conventions and agreements.. .” 
The TORs for the three Specialist panels were more specific to their fields. These 
panels were later combined into two: Science and Strategy, and Governance, Structure, 
and Finance. In the process, Co-Chairs were named. 
(2) 1998 
The process moved into high gear in 1998. The most obvious outside 
manifestation was a series of six panel meetings outside of Washington: 
n January 4-7. Science and Strategy Panel (the Hague) 
. February 27-28. Governance, Structure, and Finance (CIMMYT) 
. March l-5. Joint Panels (CIMMYT) 
. April 29-May 1. Main Panel (FAO, Rome) 
. July l-7. Science and Strategy (Nairobi) 
. July 27-30. Small panel (Manila) 
In addition, individual panel members held a few other smaller meetings at 
CGIAR Centers. Most of the larger meetings involved presentations by Centers and local 
groups in the area. One panel secretary indicated that these meetings sometimes took on 
the nature of debates and he found them very useful; the difficulty was in transmitting the 
essence of them in the report and to the CGIAR (e-mail from Griffon. S/4/00). 
The principal interactions with donors and stakeholders appear to have occurred: 
(1) in meetings of the Review Chairman and Executive Secretary with North American 
donors on April 4 in New York City and with European donors (EIARD) a little bit later 
and (2) in meetings of the Chairman, Executive Secretary and panel members during the 
MTM in Brasilia. The Chairman also made a presentation at MTM. 
Another more literary sort of approach was undertaken early in the year. Two 
surveys of stakeholder reviews were initiated, one on Science and Technology (S&T) and 
the other on Governance. Questionnaires were prepared: it is not certain if the one on 
S&T was sent; the one on Governance was sent out in January, but there was only limited 
response. In addition, several dozen letters were sent to “wise” individuals on February 
18; responses were not found and it is not apparent what use may have been made of 
them”. Lastly, the OC prepared a 17 page statement presenting its “Views on CGIAR’s 
Governance” (2/25/98). 
Early in June, the Executive Secretary sent guidelines to the two Subpanels 
outlining a proposed schedule for the preparation of their reports (first draft, submission 
6126, completion 8/20; second draft, 7/20, 7/28-3 1 Philippines; third draft, 8/l 0, 8/20). A 
schedule was also provided for the Main Panel report (finalize integrative report, 
submission 8/28, completion 9/l-7; draft panel report, 9/8, 9/25). The similarity of the 
lo The Executive Secretary recently indicated that they were carefully read and proved very helpful (conversation with 
Mahendra Shah, August 2 1,200O). 
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dates for the two panels is a bit puzzling in one way: the Governance Subpanel 
“...understood that there should be close interaction between the two panels and that the 
decisions on science should be made before the final discussions on governance” (e-mail 
from Bengtsson, 8/2/00) 
The subsequent sequence of events is not well recorded in the files but has been 
reconstructed through correspondence. In the case of the Science and Strategy Subpanel, 
the two Secretaries and the Executive Secretary of the Review worked on a first draft in 
Washington in August, with the understanding that the final report would be prepared by 
the co-chairs of the panel (e-mail from Griffon and Shah, 8/4/00). It does not seem to 
have been provided to the Governance Subpanel’ ‘. The Governance report was prepared 
on schedule. No copies of either report were found in the files. 
The principal step in the preparation of the Main Report was a meeting of the 
Review Chair, the Executive Secretary, and the two co-chairs of the S&S Committee in 
London in early September. Some other Main Panel members were invited to participate, 
but did not do so. At this time, the contents of both Subpanel reports were extensively 
discussed and appear to have been revised to some extent. The Executive Summary and 
Chapters l&2 were also prepared in London (e-mail from Shah, 8/4). 
These materials were circulated to panel members for comment. The Secretary of 
the Science and Strategy panel wrote on September 9 that “...the draft that I have 
prepared in Washington and the version dated September 7 written by the co-chairmen of 
the.. .panel are somewhat different7’12. Similarly, the Governance report was, in the eyes 
of the Secretary of that Subpanel, redrafted (Bengtsson). 
The final events were more formalized and more fully reported. The Main Panel 
met from September 22 -24: the first day involved a meeting with stakeholders, the 
second day was devoted to finalizing the report, and the third day to further work on the 
report, a meeting with the President of the World Bank, and a press conference. The 
report was issued on the 30*. 
Final stages for this step of the process included a presentation by the Chairman 
during ICW on October 26 and extensive review and discussion in plenary for the 
remainder of the week. The Secretariat Office was closed on November 15. 
A further step, which ran through much of 1999, involved the preparation of the 
popularized report “Food in the 21” Century: from Science to Sustainable Agriculture” 
(72pp.) by the Chairman and the Executive Secretary, assisted by others, and issued by 
the CGIAR Review Secretariat. 
” Hence, according to Bengtsson, ‘I . . . there was no discussion on future structure in the final report.” 
I2 A similar point of view was expressed by a member of the same Subpanel on the same date. He went on to note that 
“. _. you introduced new proposals that may be of interest but that we never had the opportunity to discuss in the Panel”. 
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C. The Report and Follow-Up by the CGIAR 
(1) The Report and the Outcome 
The report was made available on September 30. It ran into 111 pages consisting 
of: an Executive Summary, 17 chapters, and five annexes13. The chapters fell into three 
categories: Introductory (3), Science and Strategy (8)’ and Governance and Finance (6). 
Altogether, the report provided 29 recommendations and 104 sub-recommendations. The 
actual number was slightly more than this because some entries in both categories had 
several components. The Executive Summary made a valiant attempt to bring everything 
together in a logical presentation, but otherwise the report and its recommendations were 
not tightly constructed. The OC observed that “... while there were many useful ideas in 
the System Review report, they were not presented in a way that facilitated analysis and 
discussion”@. 3). 
Hence, the report proved difficult for the Group to follow and to deal with on a 
systematic basis. The vast number of recommendations and sub-recommendations had 
some overlapping. And on the other hand, some did not seem to follow from the text; in 
the words of the OC, they “... would have welcomed a presentation of more economic 
and empirical evidence to support these conclusions” (p. 3). 
Even so, some points were, or became, clear. In general, the recommendations in 
the Science and Strategy chapters proved relatively uncontroversial. Those in the 
Governance and Finance category, many of which tied back to the idea of a central body 
with legal status, proved to be more contentious. And when the central legal body idea 
was questioned, it had implications for many of the other Governance recommendations. 
(2) The Follow-Up Process 
The discussion of the Review at ICW98 went on for several days, but proved to be 
only part of the process, which in some respects is not yet complete. The three key 
additional steps were: 
(1) Follow-up consultations and reports by the OC, various committees and the 
secretariats which were distributed as a large packet on December 15; 
(2) Consideration at a special meeting of the Consultative Council in Brussels on 
January 27-28’1999; and 
(3) Consideration at the MTM on May 24-28, including a report of the OC and 
discussion in four sessions: science, partnerships, governance, and finance. 
In the end, relatively few recommendations of any significance were adopted. And 
late in 1999, at ICW, the CGIAR initiated a series of vision/strategy/restructuring 
exercises, largely led by TAC. 
I3 The report did not, curiously, contain a discussion of methodology. The first two sections of the Annex did, however, 
provide useful information and views (based in part on a survey) on CGIAR Committees and the two Secretariats (pp. 
100-105). 
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3. Organization, cost, and outcome 
Having outlined the principal stages and steps in the Third Review, we now will 
begin to fill in behind that framework. Three topics, which provide a bridge between the 
descriptive and analytical, will be noted here. 
A. Organizational Structure and Operation 
The major elements have been mentioned, but their structure should be outlined 
more clearly. This is done in the right side of Figure 3. It was, by comparison with earlier 
reviews, a fairly complex and quite different structure. The main points of similarity were 
in the existence of a Chairman (though one was quite internal and the other was external) 
and a Study .Team/System Review Secretariat (though these roles turned out to be quite 
different). Otherwise they differed sharply: the first two reviews had a Review 
Committee positioned between the Chairman and the Study Team; the Third Review had 
no such Committee, though the Oversight Committee played parts of this role (to be 
discussed in a subsequent section). The other principal difference was the extensive panel 
structure utilized in the Third Review. 
The Main Review Panel was chaired by the Chairman of the Review and was 
composed of six members, four of whom were co-chairs of Specialist Subpanels and two 
of whom were at large. The two Subpanels, in addition to the two co-chairs, contained 
five to six members and one to two professional members of the Review Secretariat. All 
of the Panel members as well as the professional staff of the Secretariat served on a part- 
time basis (only the Executive Secretary and his two support staff were full- time)14. The 
relationship between the Subpanels and the Main Panels, beyond the overlapping 
membership of the two sets of co-chairs, does not seem to have been spelled out. The 
operations of all the panels were evidently hampered by quite uneven attendance patterns 
of some panel members. 
The Review Chairman was in frequent contact with the Executive Secretary. The 
Executive Secretary and his two support staff seem to have spent much of their time 
arranging for and summarizing the various meetings of the panels. The three part-time 
professional staff appear to have spent relatively little time at the Secretariat and were 
mainly involved with the Subpanels-a somewhat ,different arrangement from the first 
two reviews when the members of the Study Team worked full time and did virtually all 
the substantive work. 
B. Budgetary Aspects 
Both direct and indirect financial costs are involved. 
l4 Two of the professional members of the Secretariat served 100 days each; the third served 110 days (data provided 
by the CGIAR Secretariat, August 11,200O). 
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(1) Direct Costs 
The overall budgetary cost of the Third Review has been mentioned: $1.5 million for the 
main review (1997-98). The preparation and production of the final popularized report 
(1999) was $155,000, bringing the total budgetary cost up to $1.655 million. The 
evolution of the expected cost, in terms of estimates reported at the time, was: July 25, 
1997, under $500,000; October 9, 1997, $600,000; October 19, 1997, $750,000; May 19, 
1997, $1 .O million; and 1998, $1.5 million. 
The first two reviews were paid for by contributions from a number of donors 
and, initially at least, it was anticipated that this practice would continue (“The costs of 
the review would be covered by CGIAR members through a special System Review 
account,” Chairman”s memo of October 16, 1996). No contributions were evidently 
forthcoming and ultimately the full cost of the main review ($1.5 million) came out of 
Bank funds. 
In terms of use of funds, the breakdown is reported in Table 1. 
Altogether, salaries and honoraria accounted for $925,000 (55.9%), travel 
$550,000 (33.2%), office operations $150,000 (9.1%), and publication $30,000 (1.8%). 
The single largest category was salaries: $705,000 (42.6%)15. 
(2) Indirect Costs 
The indirect costs of individual Center reviews have been estimated to range from 
72% (Fuglie and Ruttan, 1989, p. 375) to 100% (Ozgediz, March 6, 1998, p. 5) of direct 
costs. Certainly the Third Review entailed substantial indirect costs in terms of time of 
the various components of the CGIAR system, both in preparing for the review, 
participating, and in the follow-up process (a large portion of the time of two CGIAR 
meetings). If a 75% indirect cost is assumed, the dollar figure would be $1.241 million, 
bringing the total cost up to nearly $2.9 million; a 100% figure would bring the figure up 
to $3.3 million. 
Is By comparison, the October 16, 1999 proposal, which was based on an expected total cost of $750,000, placed 
salaries and honoraria at $250,000 (33.2%), travel $440,000 (58.7%) and other $60,000 (8.0%). The largest individual 
difference was in the “fees for Secretariat staff’, originally placed at $150,000, which later grew to be 4.7 times as 
large. 
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G. Table 1. Allocation of Budget in Third System Review 
Period and Category 
1997-98 
Salaries and Honoraria 
Secretariat Salaries 
Pane1 Members 
Other Consultants 
Travel 
Secretariat and Panel Members 
Other 
Office Operations 
Total 
Dollars 
600,000 
160,000 
40,000 
550,000 
150,000 
1,500,000 
Proportion 
(percent) 
36.25 
9.67 
2.42 
33.23 
9.06 
90.63 
1999 
Salaries and Honoraria 
Salary 
Consultants 
Publication Cost 
105,000 6.34 
20,000 1.21 
30,000 1.81 
Total 155,000 9.37 
Overall Total 1,655,OOO 100.00 
Source: CGIAR Secretariat, March 2 1, 1999 
There were other psychological costs, perhaps not uncommon in any major 
review, that are impossible to measure in financial terms, but which need to be 
considered in any larger assessment. These may arise in many ways, including unfulfilled 
expectations, and just weariness with the whole process. Both may have been evident in a 
report of the OC at the May 1999 MTM: “. . . it has been a lengthy, expensive and (very) 
difficult process, which has tested the cohesion and tolerance of the System.” (p. 2). l6 
C. Weighing the Outcome 
Clearly, as the previous two sections have revealed, the Third Review was a 
complex and expensive process. Indeed, one might wonder if there were diseconomies of 
scale: disproportionally larger costs associated with larger scale. System Reviews are not 
ventures to be embarked on lightly. Obviously the substantial costs must be offset by 
substantial benefits if the enterprise is to justify itself. Weighing the costs and benefits of 
the Third Review is well beyond our mandate and capability. Suffice it to say that as 
there are direct and indirect costs, there are also direct and indirect benefits. Some may 
have been anticipated at the outset; some may not. Some will be of an internal 
I6 Disappointment may be expressed in other ways. Pat Roy Mooney, who pushed for the review in January 1995 and 
who later became a member of the Science and Strategy Panel, turned out to be one of the most outspoken critics of the 
report. He expressed his views in a letter to the Review Chair (10123), and went on in some detail in a RAF1 news 
release (10/21) and newsletter (RAF1 Translator, 10/98). 
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(management) nature; some will be of an external (donor and public relations) nature.i7 
None will be easily measured. Hence precise weighing of the outcome will be difficult. 
4. Process issues 
What are the principal process issues arising from the Third Review that should 
be considered in contemplating and designing future System-Wide Reviews? Different 
individuals would make different choices. The ones that occur to us might be divided into : 
two categories: those that derive from the special nature or structure of the CGIAR, and 
those that are more general in nature. 
A. In CGIAR Context 
Comparison to Previous System Reviews. Obviously the Third Review was much more 
complex in its organization. But it was done at quite a different time and at a different 
stage in the development of the CGIAR 
The CGUR Culture. The Third Review questioned some important elements of the 
CGIAR culture--how it operates as a body. This was in part a reflection of the fairly high 
proportion of external panel members who did not have much experience with the central 
operation of the CGIAR. 
Relation to Other Components of the Review System. The Third Review seemed to pay 
insufficient attention to these (aside from TAC and the SPIA connection). For example 
no reference was made to the existence or contents of the first two System Reviews. 
Oversight of the Review. There was no clear definition of where the responsibility for 
oversight of the review lay. In the first two reviews this process was a key function of the 
Review Committee of stakeholders. While the Oversight Committee was in place at the 
time of the Third Review, it was never formally charged by the CGIAR or the CGIAR 
Chair with responsibility of overseeing the review. Although the CGIAR Chair was 
clearly very active during the preparatory stages, there is little indication that he played 
any particular oversight role when the review was underway. Thus there appears to have 
been only a light CGIAR oversight during the main phase of the review. 
Relations to Donors and Centers. There was not much interaction of these groups with 
the review team and panels. Few, if any, donors were interviewed as was the case in the 
first two reviews. And centers, even though they hosted some meetings and may have 
made presentations, had little follow-up dialogue’*. 
B. Of More General Nature 
” For example, participation in the review has sensitized some key individuals to the importance of the CGIAR system. 
One result was that a recent report issued by the National Academy of Science (U.S.) and six other national academies 
on Trunsgenic Plants and World Agriculture (July 2000) recognized the role of the CGIAR centers and recommended 
increased funding for them as well as other research groups. 
‘* The Executive Secretary of the review strongly disputes this contention (conversation with Mahendra Shah, August 
21,200O). This may reflect differing views of what constitutes “meaningful” interaction. 
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‘Q Purpose of Third Review. Despite the preparation of initial TOR, the real reason for and 
purpose of the review did not seem to be clear, to many stakeholders. Early references in 
the CGIAR meetings suggested to some that an external/public relations focus .was 
paramount. Others felt that the purpose was to suggest changes in the system. 
Dz@ring Expectations. A closely related point is that many stakeholders had quite 
different expectations or hopes for the system review. Some may have been inflated or 
unrealistic. But in an effort to meet these expectations, more dimensions were added to 
the review. 
Panel SeZection and Structure. The desire to bring a strong external flavor and high- 
ranking individuals on, resulted in the selection of some that were unable to attend many 
meetings or needed time to learn about the organization. The relationships between and 
relative roles of the various panels do not seem to have been clearly spelled out. 
Plan of Work. No detailed plan of work for the review seems to have been developed at 
the outset, beyond laying out some regional panel meetings. The process appears to have 
been quite ad hoc in nature, and probably resulted in a less than optimal balance in the 
use of time. 
Synthesis of Findings and Preparation of Reports.Review of, the reports of panel 
meetings suggests that -as is often the case- the time allocated for (or actually used for) 
synthesis of findings and preparation of reports was inadequate. The final report could 
have benefited from more time of work in terms of improving its structure and clarity of 
recommendations. 
6. References 
Annex 2, in contrast to Annex 1, was almost entirely based on unpublished information. 
Most of this was obtained from files: the archives (three boxes) of the Third System 
Review in the reference room at the CGIAR Secretariat; CGIAR Secretariat files; and the 
files of Dana Dah-ymple at USAID. The file material was supplemented by some personal 
interviews and e-mail correspondence with former staff members of the review and with 
members of the CGIAR Secretariat. A set of the documents utilized, presently collected 
in six notebooks, will be deposited in the reference room of the CGIAR Secretariat. 
Three types of written materials were particularly useful: (1) the published Summary of 
Proceedings and Decisions of the individual CGIAR meetings held from 1995 through 
1999 issued by the CGIAR Secretariat; (2) the bound verbatim transcripts of these 
meetings on file in the reference room in the CGIAR Secretariat; and (3) the reports of 
the Oversight Committee during this period, also on file in the reference room (bound 
with the materials for individual meetings). 
The three published reports mentioned in the Annex are: 
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